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A CRITIQUE OF THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR
EMPLOYEE SUITS IN STRICT PRODUCTS
LIABILITY AGAINST THIRD PARTY
MANUFACTURERS
Sir, the law is as I say it is, and so it has been laid
down ever since the law began; and we have several set
forms which are held as law, and so held and used for good
reason, though we cannot at present remember that
reason.
C.J. Fortescue*
INTRODUCTION

By the middle of this century, all states had enacted legislation
governing the compensation of employees for work-related injuries.' These workers' compensation statutes provide the exclusive
remedy of an employee against his or her employer for work-related
injuries, 2 but an employee sustaining an injury compensable under
workers' compensation nevertheless retains a common-law right of
action against third parties.3 Thus, the law of work-related injuries
is currently governed in part by the principles of workers' compen* 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 626 (3d ed. 1922) (quoting Y.B. 36 Hen. VI, ff. 25b-26 (1958)).
I. See A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 5.30 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as LARSON]: "By 1920 all but eight states had adopted compensation acts and on January 1, 1949, the last state, Mississippi, came under the
system." Professor Larson is one of the leading commentators on workers' compensation. His treatise is the most thorough compilation and discussion of workers'
compensation law in existence at this time.
2. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 3601 (West Supp. 1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
48, § 172.40 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-8 (West Supp.
1977); N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAW §§ 11, 29 (McKinney 1965 & Supp. 1976); OHIo
REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.74 (Baldwin 1977); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306,
§ 3 (Vernon 1967); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.03 (West 1973 & Supp. 1977); see also
LARSON, supra note 1,at § 65.10; Mitchell, Products Liability, Workmen's Compensation and the IndustrialAccident, 14 DuQ. L. REv. 349, 353 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Mitchell]; note 17 infra. Generally, reference will be made to California
workers' compensation law for purposes of illustration since it is representative of
the law in this area.
3. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 3852 (West 1971); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, §
172.40 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-40 (West 1959); N.Y.
WORK. COMP. LAW § 29 (McKinney 1965 & Supp. 1976); 77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
671 (Purdon Supp. 1977); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 3 (Vernon 1967);
WIS. STAT. ANN. 102.29 (West 1973 & Supp. 1977). See generally LARSON, supra
note 1, at § 71.00; McCoid, The Third Person in the Compensation Picture:A Study
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sation and in part by the principles of tort law. 4 This dual treatment,
which results in greatly varying measures of compensation, 5 has
stimulated much controversy as to which remedy ought to be applicable in a given context: workers' compensation, a broader tort
measure of recovery, or some combination of both. 6
Currently, when an employee receives a product-caused injury
while on the job, the employee may be entitled to workers' compensation benefits as well as a common-law cause of action7 against the
third party manufacturer' on the theory of strict products liability.9
By contrast, if the source of the injury is ascribed solely to the
of the Liabilities and Rights of Non-Employers, 37 TEXAS L. REV. 389, 393-95
(1959); see notes 73-78 & accompanying text infra.
4. The workers' compensation acts determine the scope and application of
tort law to work-related injuries either by preemption, see, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE §
3600 (West 1971), or by explicit authorization, see, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 3852
(West 1971).
5. Tort damages provide a far greater degree of compensation than workers'
compensation. See note 34 infra. Forty-three states provide less than $20,000
disability benefits for loss of an arm at the shoulder, 45 states provide less than
$15,000 disability benefits for loss of a foot, and 45 states provide less than $15,000
disability benefits for loss of an eye. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMM'N ON STATE
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS 70 (1972). These figures do not include medical
benefits provided for the injured employee.
Perusal of the newsletter of the Association of the Trial Lawyers of America
will reveal that the prevailing level of tort compensation far exceeds workers'
compensation benefits.
6. The issue has most often been phrased in terms of who should be treated
as a third party and thus be subjected to tort law, or conversely, who should be
treated as the employer and thus be subjected to workers' compensation law.
LARSON, supra note 1, at §§ 71.00-73.30; Brooks, Tort Liability of Owners and
General Contractorsfor On-The-Job Injuries to Workmen, 13 UCLA L. REV. 99
(1965); James, Social Insurance and Tort Liability: The Problem of Alternative
Remedies, 27 N.Y.U. L. REV. 537 (1952); Larson, The Rationaleof the Election of
Remedies Under Workmen's Compensation Acts, 12 U. CHI. L. REV. 231 (1945);
Larson, Workmen's Compensation Insurer as Suable Third Party, 1969 DUKE L.J.
1117; McCoid, note 3 supra; Mitchell, supra note 2, at 349; Millender, Expanding
Employees' Remedies and Third Party Actions, 17 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 32 (1968);
Comment, Workmen's Compensation and Employer Suability: The Dual Capacity
Doctrine, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 818 (1974).
7. See note 76 infra.
8. The phrase "third party manufacturer" is loosely used throughout this
Comment to designate any person or business entity in the chain of product
distribution who might be a defendant in strict products liability suits. See note 46
infra.
9. The employee's cause of action in tort against third parties is preserved
despite the availability of workers' compensation benefits. See notes 73-75 &
accompanying text infra. In suits against third party manufacturers the employee
can proceed not only on the theory of strict products liability, but also on the
grounds of negligence and express or implied warranty. For a discussion of these
three other theories of liability, see W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 641-56 (4th ed.
1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER]. These other grounds of recovery for product
injuries are not discussed because it is assumed in the vast majority of cases that a
plaintiff who can prevail on any of these three grounds can also prevail on the
doctrine of strict products liability. See Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer in
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negligence of the employee, employer, co-employee,' 0 an unavoidable consequence of the production process, or to a combination of
these factors, then compensation for the injury is limited to workers'
compensation benefits." Thus, the mere presence of a defect in
machinery or products can have a tremendous financial impact on

the amount that the employee is entitled to recover." 2
Such widely variant measures of compensation, contingent
solely upon whether a product defect contributed to an employee's

California, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 9, 18 (1966). It has been suggested that the advent of
strict products liability has made little difference in the law of product injuries. See
CALIFORNIA CITIZENS' COMM'N ON TORT REFORM, RIGHTING THE LIABILITY BAL-

ANCE 78 (1977) (unpublished draft on file at the UCLA Law Review office). In part,
the explanation for the minimal impact of the advent of strict products liability lies
in the fact that the courts had been more generous in the application of the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur to product cases prior to the establishment of strict liability for
product injuries. Id.
In terms of comparing the justifications for the doctrine of negligence and the
theory of enterprise liability, see text accompanying note 14 infra, it has been
suggested that "the scope of the negligence liability of enterprises not strictly liable
has approached that of a strict liability for typical causation, and the similarity
between both types of liabilities as to their rationale has become increasingly
obvious."

A.

EHRENZWEIG,

NEGLIGENCE

WITHOUT

FAULT 55

(1951).

Al-

though this view was presented prior to the inception of strict products liability, it is
nevertheless applicable, since strict products liability is a type of enterprise liability.
See note 14 infra.
10. Under some workers' compensation statutes, employees acting within the
scope of their employment are granted immunity from common law suits by coemployees for work-related injuries. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 3601 (West Supp.
1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 172.40 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 34:15-8 (West Supp. 1977); N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAW § 29 (McKinney 1965 &
Supp. 1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.741 (Baldwin 1977); TEV. REV. Clv.
STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 3 (Vernon 1967). For a recent discussion of statutory and
judicial authority granting employees immunity from common-law suits by coemployees, see Comment, The Third Party Action-Expanding the Circle of Immunity: Coemployees, 48 MIss. L.J. 87 (1977).
11. See, e.g., Williams v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 50 Cal. App. 3d 116, 122, 123
Cal. Rptr. 812, 814 (3d Dist. 1975) (holding that an employee's suit against his
employer on grounds of strict products liability could not be maintained where the
employer built the machine primarily for use by his own employees).
12. Employees frequently seek tort damages from third party manufacturers
for injuries resulting from defective products. According to one estimate, 30% of all
products liability suits involve industrial accidents covered by workers' compensation. O'Connell, Bargaining for Waivers of Third Party Tort Claims: An Answer to
Product Liability Woes for Employers and Their Employees and Suppliers, 1976 U.
ILL. L.F. 435, 440 n.26. Twenty-eight per cent of the products liability suits
brought in Cook County, Illinois in 1974 involved machinery. In 1975 machinery
accounted for 25% of the products liability suits. In both years machinery accounted for more product liability suits than any other type of product. Automotive
goods, the runner up category for product liability suits, accounted for only 16% of
such suits in 1974 and 13% in 1975. Because machinery is the most frequent
instrumentality of harm in products liability suits, it is reasonable to surmise that a
high proportion of product liability suits are the result of industrial accidents.
PRODUCTS, LIABILITY,

REPORT TO THE CALIFORNIA CITIZENS COMM'N ON TORT

REFORM 217 (1977) (unpublished draft on file at the UCLA Law Review office)
(citing Cook County Jury Verdicts Reporter (1974 & 1975)). Since the variance of
compensation afforded by the tort system and workers' compensation is significant, see note 5 supra, entitling employees to a common law cause of action in strict
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injury, present a special problem' 3 when one recognizes that both

strict products liability and workers' compensation are based on the
theory of enterprise liability, which posits that losses to society
created or caused by an activity ought to be borne by that activity.14
Since strict products liability and workers' compensation, as sys-

tems of enterprise liability, are justified on similar grounds,

15 one

would expect both compensation mechanisms to apply similar liability rules and measures of compensation. 16 But the law paradoxic-

ally embraces differing measures of recovery for the same injuries
depending on whether the injury stems from a product defect or
whether it is attributable solely to the employee's, employer's or co-

employee's negligence or to an unavoidable consequence of industrial production.'
This Comment will attempt to determine whether there are any

sound rationalia underlying the distinction between those situations
where workers' compensation is the exclusive remedy and those

where both workers' compensation and a strict products liability
cause of action against a third party manufacturer are available to an
injured employee. The justifications advanced for allowing common-law actions by employees against third parties will be analyzed
products liability against third party manufacturers has a substantial financial
impact.
13. The emergence of strict products liability as a distinct cause of action has
created problems of fairness within the tort system itself. Professor Franklin has
commented on the equity of applying strict liability to product-caused injuries while
retaining a negligence standard for the vast remainder of tort cases. He argues:
It is most unlikely that the courts will abolish damages for pain and
suffering in strict liability cases .

. .

. The consequence is that even

within the narrow confines of the tort system similar injuries are being
treated differently. A broken limb caused by a defective home lathe will
result in strict liability, while if the limb is broken by a truck delivering that
lathe to the home or if the lathe should topple over in the store and break a
prospective customer's leg, a showing of fault would be required. One
would be rather hard put to justify these differing treatments of identical
injuries from the point of view of either the defendant or the victim.
Franklin, Replacing the Negligence Lottery: Compensation and Selective Reimbursement, 53 VA. L. REV. 774, 793-94 (1967).
14. See Klemme, The Enterprise Liability Theory of Torts, 47 U. COLO. L.
REV. 153, 158 (1976). For a survey of various types of enterprise liability, see
Steffen, Enterprise Liability: Some Exploratory Comments, 17 HASTINGS L.J. 165
(1965).
15. See notes 17-66 & accompanying text infra.
16. See notes 65-67 infra.
17. Ostensibly, awards under workers' compensation and damages under tort
law are not designed to accomplish the same ends.
A compensation system, unlike a tort recovery, does not pretend to restore
to the claimant what he has lost; it gives him a sum which, added to his
remaining earning ability, if any, will presumably enable him to exist
without being a burden to others.
If our compensation theory is correct, then the amount of compensation awarded may be expected to go not much higher than is necessary to
keep the worker from destitution. This is indeed so.
LARSON, supra note 1, at § 2.50; see note 34 infra. Although the measures of
compensation under the two systems purportedly fulfill different objectives, it is
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and their relevance to strict products liability actions will be ascertained. 8 The Comment will argue that the present policy granting
employees remedies in both workers' compensation and strict product liability is unjustified, inequitable and inefficient.' 9 Finally, a
statutory proposal will suggest that product-caused employee injuries which are typical of the employment relation should be
compensated solely under workers' compensation.20 Productnot readily apparent, given the justifications for these systems, why different goals
should be sought.
One of the reasons commonly given for the differing rates of compensation
under the two systems is that workers' compensation benefits must be low enough
to discourage fraud or malingering. See West v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 79
Cal. App. 2d 711, 721, 180 P.2d 972, 978 (2d Dist. 1947); 2 W. HANNA, CALIFORNIA
LAW OF EMPLOYEE INJURIES AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §

1.05(5) (2d ed.

1976) [hereinafter cited as HANNA]. The danger of full compensation for employee
injuries is that the employee may choose to remain in the benefit status rather than
return to work. Berkowitz, Workmen's Compensation Income Benefits: Their Adequacy & Equity, in I SUPPLEMENTAL STUDIES FOR THE NATIONAL COMM'N ON
STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS

189 (1973). This argument is perhaps

most forceful where the employee injury falls into the categories of temporary
partial disability or temporary total disability. In these types of cases, the injury is
most likely not serious. Since the disability is of short duration, the employee's
wage loss might not be a serious economic setback. However, where the employee
sustains an injury which causes a permanent partial disability, the "malingering"
argument becomes less convincing. In these cases the worker is suffering from a
permanent impairment, the injury may be serious, and the damage caused is likely
to be substantially more than wage loss. At the extreme end of the injury spectrum,
When a worker is killed on the job or is permanently incapacitated, his
workmen's compensation benefits are based upon the wages he was earning immediately prior to his accident. Yet his wage loss is obviously the
amount of money he would have earned as wages throughout his entire
working career. Workmen's compensation statutes do not provide for any
forecast of potential earnings barring death or injury.
Id. at 219.
Another reason commonly advanced for the limited compensation of workers'
compensation is that full protection of the worker would constitute an invitation to
be careless on the job: The worker "would then lose nothing in assuming a disabled
status." West v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 79 Cal. App. 2d 711, 721, 180 P.2d
972, 979 (2d Dist. 1947). Presumably, the idea here is that it is proper or efficient to
have the worker engage in a certain amount of accident prevention to protect
himself: Full compensation would take away the incentive for workers to avoid
injuring themselves. For an example of the schedules of compensation this argument can lead to, see Table 9, Maximum Benefits for Scheduled Injuries-TheLoss
of the Fourth Finger, in Berkowitz, supra; Monroe, Workmen's Compensation
Income Benefits: Their Adequacy and Equity, in I SUPPLEMENTAL STUDIES FOR THE
NATIONAL COMM'N ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS 213 (1973).

Regardless of what one thinks of these rationalia supporting differing measures
of compensation under the tort system and under workers' compensation, they do
not indicate which employee injuries should be treated under workers' compensation and which should be treated under the tort system. Indeed, if one wanted to
decide, in terms of the twvo rationalia given, which employee victims should be
treated under the tort system, one might ask the question in this way: "For what
types of injuries is the employee entitled to malinger and from what occupational
risk is he entitled not to protect himself?" See note 96 infra.
18. See notes 80-137 & accompanying text infra.
19. Id.
20. See notes 155-68 & accompanying text infra.
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caused injuries which are atypical of the employment relation
would, in accordance with this scheme, remain compensable under
both workers' compensation and strict products liability.
I.

WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND STRICT
PRODUCTS LIABILITY: PURPOSES

Although the liability rules underlying workers' compensation
and strict products liability differ substantially, the justifications
marshalled in support of each theory are nevertheless very similar. 2'
This similarity suggests that no sound criteria can be isolated to
determine which set of liability rules, workers' compensation or

strict products liability, ought to govern product-caused employee
injuries, and, moreover, that there may not be sound reasons for
tolerating the difference in the extent of compensation available
under the two systems.
A.

Workers' Compensation

Under workers' compensation statutes, an award of benefits is
contingent upon a showing of the requisite employment relation,22
an injury or disease arising out of and in the course of employ-

ment, 23 and a showing of a compensable disability.24
25
Workers' compensation is at once a form of social insurance
21. See notes 22-71 & accompanying text infra.
22. See LARSON, supra note 1, at §§ 43.00-56.00; 2 HANNA, supra note 17, at
§ 3.01-5.02(4).
23. See LARSON, supra note 1, at §§ 6.00-42.00; 2 HANNA, supra note 17, at
§§ 9.01-10.08(5).
It has been suggested that courts have expanded the coverage of workers'
compensation by means of a liberalization of the causation requirement. See HANNA, supra note 17, at § 8.02(2)(c). See also REPORT OF THE CALIFORNIA CITIZENS'
COMM'N, RIGHTING THE LIABILITY BALANCE 38 (1977); Malone, The Limits of

Coverage in Workmen's Compensation-The Dual Requirement Reappraised, 5i
N.C.L. REV. 705 (1973). An expansion of workers' compensation coverage may of
course result in curtailing the employee's common-law right of action for damages
against third parties. See note 66 infra.
24. See LARSON, supra note 1,at §§ 57.00-64.50; 2 HANNA supra note 17, at §§
11.01-11.03(5).
25. This point has been observed by various authorities:
Workmen's Compensation is basically a branch of social insurance ...
The real characteristic of social insurance is the fact that the worker is
entitled to the benefits as a matter of right, irrespective of need; that the
hazard which is involved is a typified hazard of modern society; loss or
reduction of earning power; and that there is a certain standardization of
benefits and de-technicalization in the procedure.
Riesenfeld, Forty Years of American Workmen's Compensation, 35 MINN. L. REV.
525, 530 (1951).
[Workmen's compensation is] founded on the "incontrovertible principle
that society has the right to protect itself from those influences which tend
to force large numbers of persons below the poverty line, thereby making
them a menace to social order and social safety. This is why society has
said to its industries that they must take care of their own killed and
wounded."
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and a type of liability mechanism. 26 The widespread establishment
of workers' compensation schemes early in this century was partially in response to substantive tort law barriers 27 and administrative
barriers2 to employee recovery. The major argument for the establishment of an independent compensation system for work-related
injuries, however, was the social policy of keeping injured and
P. NONET, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE 18-19 (1969) [hereinafter cited as NONET]
(quoting an address by the Chairman of the Industrial Accident Commission in
1915). "The theory of the compensation law is not to provide indemnity for
negligent acts or compensation for legal wrongs as at common law but to furnish
economic insurance." Lowman v. Stafford, 226 Cal. App. 2d 31, 38, 37 Cal. Rptr.
681, 684 (3d Dist. 1964); see Union Iron Works v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 190
Cal. 33, 39, 210 P. 410, 413 (1922); Moore Shipbuilding Corp. v. Industrial Accident
Comm'n, 185 Cal. 200, 205, 196 P. 257, 259 (1921).
26. The American workmen's compensation system is distinguishable
from public social insurance in its essentially private nature, in the question
of qualification for and measure of benefits, in the allocation of the burden
of payment, in its retention of some relation between hazard and liability,
and in its mechanism of unilateral employer liability.
LARSON, supra note 1, at § 3.00.
27. The substantive tort law barriers facing the worker at common law were
the defense of assumption of risk, its corollary the fellow servant rule, and the
defense of contributory negligence. In accordance with the prevailing nineteenth
century intellectual climate of extreme individualism, Priestley v. Fowler, 3 M. &
W. 1, 150 Eng. Rep. 1030 (Ex. 1837), established both the doctrine of assumption of
risk and the fellow servant rule in the field of employee injuries. In defining the
application of assumption of risk, Lord Abinger stated:
The servant is not bound to risk his safety in the service of his master, and
may, if he thinks fit, decline any service in which he reasonably apprehends injury to himself: and in most of the cases in which danger may
be incurred, if not in all, he is just as likely to be acquainted with the
probability and extent of it as is the master.
Id. at 6, 150 Eng. Rep. at 1032-33. Under the fellow servant rule, one of the risks
the employee assumed as a matter of law was the negligence of his fellow employees. The doctrine of assumption of risk and the fellow servant rule found their way
into American common law via Farwell v. Boston & Worcester R.R., 45 Mass. (4
Met.) 49 (1842). The rule of contributory negligence was established in Butterfield
v. Forrester, I I East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809). See Smith, Sequel to
Workmen's Compensation Acts, 27 HARV. L. REV. 235, 242 (1914). For a complete
history of the employer defenses, their erosion, and the first attempts at worker's
compensation, see W. DODO, ADMINISTRATION OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 1-52
(1936); 2 HANNA, supra note 17, at § 1.00; LARSON, supra note 1, at §§ 4.00-6.00.

Many of the tort barriers to employee recovery in the courts had been struck
down by legislation prior to the inception of workers' compensation. Larson suggests that this "precompensation legislation" did no more than restore "the employee to a position no worse than that of a stranger injured by the negligence of the
employer or his servants." LARSON, supra note 1, at § 4.50. Larson concludes that
the pre-compensation legislation -did not adequately protect employees and that
"some entirely new principle was needed." Id. For another view, suggesting that
workers' compensation schemes were designed to meet the needs of private business groups as much as those of injured workers, see Weinstein, Big Business and
the Origins of Workmen's Compensation, 8 LAB. HIST. 156 (1%7); see also
Lubove, Workmen's Compensation and the Prerogatives of Voluntarism, 8 LAB.
HIST. 254 (1%7).
28. Because of their low socio-economic status workers could ill afford the
expensive cost and time consuming delays of the tort system. See DODD, ADMINISTRATION OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 19-26 (1936).

UCLA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25: 125

disabled workers above the poverty line 29 without making them
public charges. 3 °
The workers' corpensation systems have been viewed as a

balancing of interests. 3On the one hand, the employee gets the
benefits of a no-fault system which theoretically assures speedy
29. LARSON, supra note 1,at § 4.30; see NONET, supra note 25, at 16-40
(1969), citing a Chairman of the Industrial Accident Commission in 1914:
"Workmen's compensation is only one of the numerous problems causing
our present social unrest

. . .

approximately 40 per cent of the poverty

is chargeable to work accidents; and when we have poverty, we have
crime, insanity, and all other forms of social evils. . . .It is apparent on
the face of it that if these injured people, instead of being unable to bear
their burden directly, had been compensated at the time of their injury by
industrial compensation . .. so that they could have rehabilitated their
earning power and thus kept [themselves] from dropping over into the
poverty line, that society would have been richer, private property safer,
and our taxes much less."
Id. at 18.
30. See NONET, supra note 25, at 41-65. Nonet sets forth the two broad alternatives presented to the founders of workmen's compensation. The first possibility was to establish a system of accident insurance for employees. Under this
approach, accident insurance would have been managed by the state or by labor
organizations for the direct benefit of injured employees. With this approach, there
is a priori no reason why the scheme should affect the common law rights of
employees against their employers. This welfare approach was not taken. The
second possibility, the one adopted, was to impose a liability on the employer for
employee injuries and to provide for a system of liability insurance to protect the
employer against the risk of liability. The receipt of insurance proceeds by an
injured worker under the first approach would have been clearly independent of his
common law rights against the employer: indeed, the first approach presents a
classic collateral source rule situation. The receipt of benefits by a disabled worker
under the second approach, however, is contingent upon liability rules. The adoption of the second approach favored discarding the common law rights of employees against their employers: The idea that one set of liability rules would govern the
rights of employees against their employers seemed perhaps more appealing and
more elegant than the idea of having two sets of liability rules governing the
employment relation.
However, the notion that two sets of liability rules cannot apply to the same
relation is by no means universally acknowledged. In the German Federal Republic,
an injured employee covered by workers' compensation can sue for damages in
excess of the benefits due him under the work-accident insurance law for injuries
resulting from the intentional act or the gross negligence of a fellow employee or the
employer. NATIONAL COMM'N ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS, COMPENDIUM ON WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 70 (1973).

Interestingly, in the USSR, work related injuries are given preferential treatment, resulting in greater compensation than injuries caused by other social risks.
Id. at 73. In the Netherlands, "[work-connected risks and the needs for services
and cash benefits arising therefrom are treated no differently from other contingencies." Id. at 76.
31. See LARSON, supra note 1, at § 65.10; 2 HANNA, supra note 17, at §
1.05(8).
[Workers' compensation is] a socially enforced bargain which compels an
employee to give up his valuable right to sue in the courts for full recovery
of damages . . . in return for a certain, but limited, award. It compels the
employer to give up Ills
right to assert common-law detenses in return for
assurance that the amount of recovery by the employee will be limited.
Van Horn v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 219 Cal. App. 457, 467, 33 Cal. Rptr.
169, 174 (2d Dist. 1963).
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compensation for any work-related injury or disease;3 2 on the other
hand, the employer is absolved from the threat of common-law
liability and its attendant costs 33 in so far as the amount of recovery

under workers' compensation is far more limited than under tort
law. 34 The California Labor Code states that workers' compensation
is the exclusive remedy of an employee against his employer for
work-related injuries. 31

B.

Products Liability
Unlike workers' compensation, the theory of strict products

liability is a relatively recent judicial development.36 If at the turn of
32. The purpose of workers' compensation is to "accomplish substantial
justice in all cases expeditiously, inexpensively, and without encumbrance of any
character." CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 21; see CAL. LAB. CODE § 3201 (West 1971).

33. "Where the conditions of compensation exist [See CAL. LAB. CODE § 3600
(West 1971)] the right to recover such compensation, pursuant to the provisions of
this division is except as provided in Section 3706, the exclusive remedy for injury
or death of an employee against the employer."

CAL. LAB. CODE § 3601 (West

1971). See note 2 supra.
34. Awards under workers' compensation are much less than damages under
tort law. Awards of workers' compensation benefits are designed to provide the
employee with an adequate means of subsistence.
The purpose of the award is not to make the employee whole for the loss
which he has suffered, but to prevent him and his dependents from becoming public charges during the period of his disability. In short the award
transfers a portion of the loss suffered by the disabled employee from him
and his dependents to the consuming public.
West v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 79 Cal. App. 2d 711, 721, 180 P.2d 972, 978
(2d Dist. 1947) (citations omitted); see also Solari v. Atlas-Universal Serv., Inc.,
215 Cal. App. 2d 587, 600, 30 Cal. Rptr. 407, 414 (lst Dist. 1963): "Ithas been
suggested that workers' compensation benefits cannot be fully compensatory because their only function is to provide the injured worker and his family a reasonable subsistence and to effectuate rehabilitation. Compensation exceeding the
satisfaction of these goals might invite fraud and malingering." See also 2 HANNA, supra note 17, at § 1.05(5); note 17 supra. For a discussion of the adequacy of
workers' compensation benefits, see Berkowitz, Workmen's CompensationIncome
Benefits: Their Adequacy & Equity, in 1 SUPPLEMENTAL STUDIES FOR THE NATION-

189 (1973).
In the summer of 1976, the Machinery and Allied Products Institute conducted
a survey among several hundred manufacturers of industrial products. Among the
data accumulated was a breakdown of product liability claims in 1975 by the type of
claimant. Claims made by insurance companies in subrogation suits for benefits
paid to injured employees under workers' compensation averaged $14,000. Claims
by injured consumers averaged $168,000. Claims by employees of other companies,
i.e., suits against third parties, averaged $93,000. In terms of the percentage of the
total average amount of money claimed by the three groups, consumers accounted
for 38%, injured employees accounted for 60% and subrogation suits by the insurAL COMM'N ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS

ance companies of employers accounted for 2%. PRODUCTS LIABILITY, REPORT TO
THE CALIFORNIA CITIZENS COMM'N ON TORT REFORM 237 (1977) (unpublished draft

on file at the UCLA Law Review office).
35. See note 33 supra.
36. The establishment of strict products liability as an independent ground for
recovery has traditionally been ascribed to Mr. Justice Traynor's concurring opinion in Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1963):
Although in these cases strict liability has usually been based on the theory
of an express or implied warranty running from the manufacturer to the
plaintiff, the abandonment of the requirement of a contract between them,
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the century the worker had great difficulties in obtaining compensa-

tion, 3" the consumer fared no better. 38 With few exceptions,3 9 the

consumer could look only to his immediate supplier for recovery,4°
and often the immediate supplier was not at fault. 4 Although

the recognition that the liability is not assumed by agreement but imposed
by law . . and the refusal to permit the manufacturer to define the scope
of its own responsibility for defective products . . . make clear that the
liability is not one governed by the law of contract warranties but by the
law of strict liability in tort.
Id. at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701 (citations omitted).
37. See notes 27-29 & accompanying text supra.
38. Whether the consumer sought recovery for product-caused injuries on the
grounds of negligence or warranty, the manufacturer of the product was protected
by the requirement of privity of contract. The famous case of Winterbottom v.
Wright, 10 M. & W. 1.09, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Exch. 1842), denied recovery toa victim who sought to base the defendant's duty of due care on a contract between the
defendant and the third party. Winterbottom was interpreted to mean that a manufacturer or a supplier of goods could not be held liable either in contract or tort for
injuries due to defective products by a person not in privity of contract with the
manufacturer or supplier, excepting certain circumstances. Huset v. J.1. Case
Threshing Mach. Co., 120 F. 865 (8th Cir. 1903). For a thorough compilation of
references on the subject of the consumer's rights against manufacturers, see
PROSSER, supra note 9, at 641-56; Gillam, Products Liability in a Nutshell, 37 ORE.
L. REV. 119, 128-31 nn.39-40 (1958). See generally Prosser, The Assault Upon the
Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1099-114 (1960).
39. The three exceptions to the privity of contract requirement were set forth
in Huset v. J.1. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 120 F. 865 (8th Cir. 1903). The first
exception was where the defendant supplier knew of the defect, but sold the
product anyway. Langdridge v. Levy, 2 M. & W. 519, 150 Eng. Rep. 863 (Exch.
1836). The second exception was based on a case where a plaintiff employee was
hurt because of a defective rope in a staging provided by the defendant for use on
the defendant's premises. The employee's employer had contracted with the defendant to use the latter's premises: The employee was thus treated as a business
visitor and the defective rope as part of the real property. Heaven v. Pender, II
Q.B.D. 503 (C.A. 1883). The last exception, and the most important in terms of
future developments, dealt with situations where the product was inherently or
imminently dangerous. Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 396 (1852).
40. The beginning of the end for the privity requirement in actions based on
negligence has traditionally been ascribed to MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217
N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916), where Mr. Justice Cardozo interpreted and considerably broadened the "inherently dangerous article" exception to the privity
requirement:
We hold then, that the principle of Thomas v. Winchester is not limited to
poisons, explosives, and things of like nature, to things which in their
normal operation are implements of destruction. If the nature of a thing is
such that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when
negligently made, it is then a thing of danger.
Id. at 389, 111 N.E. at 1053. The break from the privity requirement in warranty
cases has traditionally been ascribed to Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32
N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
41. Indeed, given that the immediate supplier is often only an intermediary
between the consumer and the manufacturer, and given that he is often in no better
position than the consumer to determine the risks of the product or to do anything
to minimize risks, the consumer's cause of action against the immediate supplier or
retailer was very limited.
It is here that negligence liability breaks down. The wholesaler, the jobber,
and the retailer normally are simply not negligent. They are under no duty
to test or inspect the chattel, and they do not do so; and when, as is usually
the case today, it comes to them in a sealed container, examination be-
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various state legislatures and the Congress established compensation systems of enterprise liability for injuries sustained in the
course of the manufacture of products, 4" the task of devising an
enterprise liability system for injuries sustained as the result of the
use or consumption of products was left to the courts.4 3
comes impossible without destroying marketability. No inference of negligence can arise against these sellers, and res ipsa loquitur is of no use at all.
Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE
L.J. 1099, 1117 (1960) (footnotes omitted). As for warranty, Prosser writes:
It is true that against the retailer, the consumer who buys for himself and is
injured can rely, in all but a few states, upon the old sales warranties of
merchantable quality and fitness for the purpose. But so long as the privity
wall stands firm, these warranties are of no avail against the wholesaler;
nor do they protect the buyer's wife or child, his employee, his guest, his
donee, or his subpurchaser.
Id. at 1117-18 (footnotes omitted).
42. Part of the reason why legislatures enacted an enterprise liability scheme
for injuries occurring in the course of employment, but not in the course of
consumption of the product, has to do with the characteristics of the victim class in
both cases. Those who are injured in the production process form a social class in
the sense that the members have more or less the same socio-economic status (i.e.,
working class). Employees were in a particularly poor position as a class to bear the
burden of accident costs. The choice of an enterprise liability rule for employees
had a lot to do with the distributional goal of preventing the working class from
becoming destitute. See notes 17, 27-29 supra; note 64 infra. The distributional goal
of protecting the working class is apparent in the workers' compensation act's first
formulation of the independent contractor exclusion. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3357 (West
1971). As originally adopted, the workers' compensation act defined independent
contractor as excluding persons performing manual labor. 1917 Cal. Stats. ch. 586
§ 8(b) (repealed 1937). In other words, manual laborers were excluded from one of
the largest exemptions to the workers' compensation act. This discrimination was
later held unconstitutional in Flickenger v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 181 Cal.
425, 184 P. 851 (1919).
In contrast to employees, consumers have never been considered a homogeneous socio-economic class. Thus, the burden of bearing accident costs for product
injuries did not seem to have any noticeable effect on the welfare of any particular
social class.
43. Professor Prosser argued that, even granting the elimination of the privity
of contract requirement, negligence and warranty law were not sufficient protection
for the consumer. Prosser maintained that warranty was poorly suited to provide
injured consumers a cause of action because of its statute of limitations, provisions
for disclaimers, requirements of reliance on the part of the consumer and of notice
to the warrantor. Negligence also did not provide an adequate ground for recovery
because the consumer was ill-equipped to bear the cost of the accident regardless of
whether the conduct of the manufacturer was negligent. See PROSSER, supra note 9,
at 641-74. See also Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 30, 34-35 (1973).
For a history of the emergence of strict products liability from the theories of
negligence and warranty, see PROSSER, supra note 9, at 641-74; Gillam, Product
Liability in a Nutshell, 37 ORE. L. REV. 119 (1958); Keeton, Products LiabilityLiability Without Fault and the Requirement of a Defect, 41 TEX. L. REV. 855
(1963); Noel, Products Liability of Retailers and Manufacturers in Tennessee, 32
TENN. L. REV. 207 (1965); Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to
the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict
Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966).
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The basic requirements for strict products liability as set forth
in the Second Restatement of Torts" are that the product be

defective and unreasonably dangerous, 4 5 and that the defect exist at
the time the product leaves the defendant's hands. 46 The principal
affirmative defenses 7 to a cause of action in strict products liability
are assumption of the risk48 and abnormal use of the product. 49 The

status of contributory negligence or comparative negligence as a
defense to strict products liability remains uncertain."
44. 1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability
for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to
his property, if
a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and
b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and
b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). For a recent discussion of cases
construing § 402A and applying the doctrine of Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods.,
Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963), see Montgomery & Owen,
Reflections on the Theory and Administrationof Strict Tort Liability for Defective
Products, 27 S.C.L. REV. 803 (1976).
45. To recover, the injured party must demonstrate in addition that the defect
was both the cause in fact and the proximate cause of the plaintiff's damages. See
PROSSER, supra note 9, at 236, 244 (chapters on cause in fact and proximate cause).
For a discussion of the appropriate test of causation to be applied in strict
products liability cases, see Pollele, The ForeseeabilityConcept and Strict Products
Liability: The Odd Couple of Tort Law, 8 RuT-CAM. L. REV. 101 (1976). Professor
Pollele suggests that the foreseeability test of causation commonly used in negligence cases would infuse strict products liability with unwanted fault and negligence considerations.
46. For a list of some of the newer parties potentially liable under strict
products liability, see Rheingold, The Expanding Liability of the Product Supplier:
A Primer, 2 HOFSTRA L. REV. 521, 545 (1974).
47. The limitation of the scope of liability imposed under strict products
liability remains uncertain. Professor Holford writes that neither the courts nor the
commentators have articulated a cogent theory delimiting the scope of strict products liability. "When courts deny recovery, they generally do so on grounds of
assumption of risk, product misuse or adequacy of warning, thus avoiding the
central question." Holford, The Limits of Strict Liability for Product Design and
Manufacture, 52 TEX. L. REV. 81, 81-82 (1973). See also Noel, Defective Products,
Abnormal Use, Contributory Negligence and Assumption of Risk, 25 VAND. L.
REV. 93 (1972).
48. Assumption of risk requires that a defendant have "voluntarily exposed
himself to a known danger and knew and appreciated the risk involved." Sperling v.
Hatch, 10 Cal. App. 3d 54, 61, 88 Cal. Rptr. 704, 708 (4th Dist. 1970). To the extent
that assumption of risk is merely a variant of contributory negligence, it will be
subsumed under comparative negligence. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 829,
119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 875, 532 P.2d 1226, 1243 (1975). See note 50 infra.
49. Abnormal use or misuse of the product is defined as use for a purpose
neither intended nor foreseeable. Thompson v. Package Mach. Co., 22 Cal. App. 3d
188, 196, 99 Cal. Rptr. 281, 286 (2d Dist. 1971).
50. The present status of contributory negligence in relation to strict products
liability is at best uncertain because California has only recently adopted compara-
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Strict products liability is not a no-fault system in the same

sense as workers' compensation. 51 Manufacturers are not made
insurers of their products, nor are they held liable for all losses
resulting from the use of their products. An injured party must still
prove the existence of a defect in order to recover. 52 The purposes of

strict products liability53 include risk spreading,5 4 safety promo-

tive negligence as the governing principle in negligence cases. Li v. Yellow Cab Co.,
13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975). In the recent case of Horn
v. General Motors Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 359, 551 P.2d 398, 131 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1976), two
justices of the California Supreme Court indicated that comparative negligence
would apply to strict products liability. Id. at 373-80, 551 P.2d at 405-10, 131 Cal.
Rptr. at 85-90 (Clark & McComb, JJ., dissenting). Professor V. E. Schwartz has
argued that comparative negligence may be applied to strict products liability cases
and that the assumption of risk defense should be subsumed under the rubric of
comparative negligence. Schwartz, Strict Liability and Comparative Negligence, 42
TENN. L. REV. 171 (1974).
In the past, California has followed the Restatement position on the application
of contributory negligence to strict products liability cases:
Contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense when such negligence consists merely in a failure to discover the defect in the product, or
to guard against the possibility of its existence. On the other hand the form
of contributory negligence which consists in voluntarily and unreasonably
proceeding to encounter a known danger, and commonly passes under the
name of assumption of risk is a defense under this Section ....
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment n, at 356 (1965); see Luque v.
McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 145 n.9, 501 P.2d 1163, 1170 n.9, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443, 449-50
n.9 (1972); Barth v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal, App. 2d 228, 243, 71 Cal.
Rptr. 306, 314 (1st Dist. 1968).
51. Although it is widely agreed that workers' compensation is a no-fault
system, it does not follow that an employee can obtain disability benefits for any
and all work-related injuries. Thus, in California, disability benefits are denied
where the injury or death, though work-related, is caused by intoxication of the
employee or where it is intentionally self-inflicted or where it arises out of an
altercation in which the injured employee is the initial aggressor. CAL. LAB.
CODE § 3600 (West 1971). The denial of disability benefits in these circumstances is
presumably based on the view that such types of injuries are not properly attributable to the employment relation and do not represent costs of production per se. It
is apparently this same notion which informs the judgement by the courts in product
liability cases that injuries sustained as a result of voluntary encounters of known
risks and abnormal use are not properly attributable to the manufacturer's enterprise of production for profit. See Holford, The Limits of Strict Liability for
Product Design and Manufacture, 52 TEX. L. REV. 81, 88-89 (1973).
52. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr.
433 (1972).
53. For a thorough compilation of articles on the "deeper recesses" of the
theory of strict products liability, see Montgomery & Owen, supra note 44, at 808
n.12. The basic conceptual framework of strict products liability is still not clearly
settled. See note 47 supra. A compilation of various proposed tests for strict
products liability is contained in Montgomery & Owen, note 44 supra.
54. The risk spreading or loss distribution rationale is one of the mainstays of
strict products liability doctrine.
[Lioss distribution . . . holds the manufacturer liable for injuries resulting
from use of his product because he is in the best position to distribute those
losses. He can test the product, evaluate its potential for harm, and then
insure against that harm, passing on the insurance costs through increases
in the product's price.
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tion," obviation of proof problems in the application of a negligence standard to product cases, 56 and protection of consumer
expectations."
C.

Products Liability and Workers' Compensation Compared
The similarity of purpose underlying workers' compensation
and strict products liability is striking. 58 Both workers' compensaHolford, The Limits of Strict Liability for Product Design and Manufacture, 52
TEX. L. REV. 81, 82 (1973). See also Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of
Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30, 34-35 (1973); Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort
Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J.. 825, 826 (1973).
55. The rationale of "injury reduction, holds the manufacturer liable because
he is in the best position to discover and correct the dangerous aspects of his
products before any injury occurs." Holford, The Limits of Strict Liability for
Product Design and Manufacture, 52 TEX. L. REV. 81, 82-83 (1973); see also
Keeton, Products Liability-Some Observations About Allocation of Risks, 64
MICH. L. REV. 1329, 1333 (1966); Wade, note 54 supra. Contra, Posner, Strict
Liability: A Comment, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 205 (1973). Professor Posner argues that
the imposition of a strict liability standard in product injury cases will not, in the
long run, lead to higher and more efficient levels of safety. The shift from a
negligence to a strict liability standard merely shifts the safety research incentive
from consumers to manufacturers, Whereas under a negligence standard consumers bear the brunt of unavoidable accidents, under a strict liability standard the
burden of unavoidable accidents is borne by manufacturers. Whichever liability
rule is adopted by the courts, either strict liability or negligence, it follows that in
the long run whoever bears the cost of unavoidable accidents will organize to
reduce the frequency of such accidents where it is economically worthwhile to do
so. Professor Posner's analysis depends of course on the controversial assumption
that a negligence standard is in fact adequate to make manufacturers compensate
consumers for all negligently caused product injuries. If it were true that negligent
manufacturers could frequently escape liability under a negligence standard because of difficulties in proving or discovering their negligence, then a strict liability
standard might be necessary to force compensation for all negligently caused
product injuries. Such a standard would be more efficient to the extent that it
succeeded in actually forcing compensation of all negligently caused product injuries. See note 56 infra.
56. See PROSSER, note 9 supra. "A majority of product accidents not caused
by product abuse are probably attributable to the negligent acts or omissions of
manufacturers at some stage of the manufacturing or marketing process, yet the
difficulties of discovering and proving this negligence are often practicably
insurmountable." Montgomery & Owen, supra note 44, at 809. In opposition, it has
been suggested that the proof required to maintain a cause of action in strict
products liability would also be sufficient to support a cause of action in negligence.
Wade, supra note 54, at 836-37. See generally Keeton, note 54 supra;Wade, note 54
supra.
57. "Manufacturers convey to the public a general sense of product quality
through the use of mass advertising and merchandising practices, causing consumers to rely for their protection upon the skill and expertise of the manufacturing
community." Montgomery & Owen, supra note 44, at 809. See also Dickerson,
ProductsLiability: How Good Does a Product Have to Be?., 42 IND. L.J. 301, 305-08
(1967): Fischer, Products Liability-The Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L. REV. 339,
348-52 (1974); Holford, note 54 supra; Keeton, note 54 supra; Keeton, Products
Liability-Inadequacy of Information, 48 TEX. L. REV. 398, 399 (1970); Rheingold,
What are the Consumer's Reasonable Expectations?, 22 Bus. LAW. 589, 597-98
(1967); Wade, note 54 supra.
58. Professor Larson warns against confusing worker's compensation with
strict liability. He demonstrates the functional differences between the strict liability applied in ultrahazardous activities and the type of liability imposed by workers'
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tion and strict products liability have been viewed as responses to

the depersonalization and specialization of modern industry-social
developments which eclipsed consideration of fault and negligence. 9 Neither system regards fault as essential; 6° both are prefaced by the recognition that the individual victim is in a poor

position to bear the costs of injury ;61 and both operate on the
compensation. LARSON, supra note 1, at § 2.20. In one system, liability attaches by

virtue of the fact that the employee is injured while engaged in a loosely defined
employment activity. In the other, liability attaches by virtue of the fact that the
victim is injured by exposure to a particular kind of risk inherent in the instrumentality of harm.
Nevertheless, Larson states:
The ultimate social philosophy behind compensation liability is belief in the
wisdom of providing, in the most efficient, most dignified, and most
certain form, financial and medical benefits for the victims of work-connected injuries which an enlightened community would feel obliged to
provide in any case in some less satisfactory form, and of allocating the
burden of these payments to the most appropriate source of payment, the
consumer of the product.
LARSON, supra note 1, at § 2.20. If this statement is compared with Mr. Justice
Traynor's concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453,
150 P.2d 436 (1944), the similarity of purposes between workers' compensation and
strict products liability becomes evident.
Even if there is no negligence, however, public policy demands that responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to
life and health inherent in defective products that reach the market ...
Those who suffer injury from defective products are unprepared to meet
its consequences. The cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may
be an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one,
for the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed
among the public as a cost of doing business.
fd. at 462, 150 P.2d at 440-41.
59. Jeremiah Smith suggested in 1914 that the appearance of workers' compensation was the result of changes in then modern industry.
Workmen are now frequently employed in large masses, so that the personal supervision of the employer is no longer possible. The danger of serious
harm to the workman in some modern undertakings was at first much
greater than under the old form of industry; and it was more difficult to
prove fault on the part of the employer.
Smith, Sequel to Workmen's Compensation Acts, 27 HARV. L. REV. 235, 242
(1914).
The same sort of social vision is now used to explain the birth of strict products
liability. "Consumers no longer have the ability to protect themselves adequately
from defective products due to the vast number and complexity of products which
must be 'consumed' in order to function in modern society." Montgomery & Owen,
supra note 44, at 809.
60. Fault is not essential under workers' compensation, see CAL. LAB. CODE §
3600 (West 1971), nor under strict products liability, see note 46 supra.
The most striking aspect of the doctrine [strict products liability] is that
liability is imposed without regard to whether the seller was in any way at
fault or, conversely, whether he exercised the greatest possible care. The
doctrine of strict tort purports to direct attention away from the conduct of
the seller, at least according to traditional theory, and to focus it instead
upon the injury-producing product in its environment of use.
Montgomery & Owen, supra note 44, at 808-09. But see Cowan, Some Policy Bases
of Products Liability, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1077, 1089 (1%5).
61. See note 58 supra. Professor Henderson has suggested that the policies
underlying workers' compensation have undergone fundamental change. Whereas
the original aim of workers' compensation was to compensate employees for work-
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assumption that the costs of injuries will and should be passed on to
the consumers of the product. 62

The one outstanding divergence in the arguments advanced in
support of strict products liability and workers' compensation is the
overt distributional aim of workers' compensation-keeping the
working class above the poverty level. 63 The implementation of this
distributional goal within the framework of a compensation system

can be criticized as both unfair and inefficient.' Moreover, the goal
related injuries, the present policy is to compensate the worker regardless of the
origin of the risk. "The unarticulated, but apparently emerging policy, as evidenced
by the decisions referred to above, seems to be a desire to provide economic
security and medical care for society in general." Henderson, Should Workmen's
Compensation be Extended to NonoccupationalInjuries?,48 TEX. L. REV. 117, 126
(1969).
Professor Franklin likewise sees a shift in the basic policies underlying tort
law:
Today one can muster substantial evidence of society's desire to shift
the focus from the defendant and his conduct to the victim and his plight.
This is revealed, for example, in the way the legal system today handles
personal injury cases, especially those cases in which the court have
altered the very basis of liability from fault to strict liability. Whether the
expansion in the defective product area is viewed as an extension of
warranty law or as a development of tort law, the crucial point is that many
victims who previously had to prove fault in this important area are now
able to recover without such a showing.
Franklin, Replacing the Negligence Lottery: Compensation and Selective Reimbursement, 53 VA. L. REV. 774, 785 (1967).
62. See note 58 supra. "The philosophy of workmen's compensation. . . is
that losses should be allocated to the enterprise that creates the hazards that causes
[sic] the losses, and ultimately distributed among those who consume its products."
James, Social Insurance and Tort Liability: The Problem of Alternative Remedies,
27 N.Y.U.L. REV. 537, 538 (1952). It remains questionable whether workers'
compensation fulfills this objective.
See Burton & Berkowitz, Objectives Other Than Income Maintenance for
Workmen's Compensation, 38 J. RISK & INS. 343 (1971). "But workmen's compensation awards generally understate the actual economic loss. . . .An accident may
mean a large loss of human capital and increased costs associated with acquisition
of new personnel. These costs may far exceed any insurance penalty imposed by
workmen's compensation." Id. at 355.
For a discussion of different types of cost distortion affecting manufacturers
and the consuming public, the costs of insurance and litigation, see O'Connell, note
12 supra.
63. See note 29 supra.
64. One may question whether it is the proper function of liability rules to
foster distributional goals (such as preventing the impoverishment of the lower
classes). See Fletcher, Fairnessand Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537,
547 n.40 (1972). Professor Fletcher argues that distributional goals concern
questions of distributive justice (i.e., the proper or equitable distribution of goods in
a given society). Liability rules, however, are part of the sphere ot corrective
justice (i.e., the proper societal response when an individual violates the principles
of equitable distribution, e.g., by stealing or inflicting injury). See also J. RAWLS,
A THEORY OF JUSTICE 8 (1971).
If one is concerned with a distributional objective such as preventing poverty,
then restructuring liability rules to alleviate the plight of the poor may be neither a
fair nor an efficient way to fulfill the objective. It is not fair because liability rules
do not increase the wealth of all members of impoverished class; yet, if the distri-
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of wealth distribution is a highly debatable normative justification
for workers' compensation.'

If one does not accept the distributional goal of workers' compensation as a valid normative consideration, the coincidence of the
justifications for strict products liability and workers' compensation

makes it difficult to reconcile the varying measures of compensation
butional goal is valid, they are equally entitled. It is not efficient in pursuing distributional goals because, generally taxation will effectuate the goal more directly and
less expensively. In addition, the grant of a favorable liability rule to an impoverished class may result in a misallocation of resources where those who are protected
by the liability rule would rather have some other economic good, such as food or
shelter. If the members of the impoverished class prefer an economic good other
than a liability rule, they will have to "sell" the liability rule and such sales involve
transaction costs: The sellers may not be able to find a buyer easily and the
negotiations of the sales themselves may be costly. See generally Calabresi &
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). See also Demsetz, When Does the Rule of
Liability Matter?, I J. LEGAL STUD. 13 (1972). The misallocation of resources may
be particularly serious when the class member protected by the liability rule cannot
sell it: The courts often prevent parties from contracting to avoid the impact of
liability rules. A good example is strict products liability-the courts refuse to allow
manufacturers to disclaim their responsibility for injuries by appropriate warnings.
See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963), discussed at note 23 supra.
Professors Calabresi and Melamed have outlined the circumstances in which
rules of inalienability, rules preventing the sale of particular types of goods, may be
efficient. Calabresi & Melamed, supra. The achievement of efficiency by means of
inalienability rules is based on the view that the concept of economic efficiency, as
distinguished from Pareto optimality, does not depend on the individualistic premise that individuals know what is best for them. Id. at 1094 n.10. Rules of inalienability may be appropriate for several distinct reasons: paternalism (one party is
better able to judge the good of another party), self-paternalism (a party decides to
eliminate his short-term freedom of choice in order to secure some long term good)
and externalities (the sale of a good imposes tremendous costs on a third party who,
because of transaction costs, cannot prevent the seller from selling or the buyer
from buying). Calabresi & Melamed, supra, at 1111-15. The implications of these
views on the distributional goal of workers' compensation are discussed in note 65
infra.
65. Many writers have attempted to justify workers' compensation by arguing
that workers at the turn of the century could not afford the tort system; that indeed
the tort system was responsible for the impoverishment of the working class. See,
e.g., 2 HANNA, supra note 17, at § 1.05(1); see also notes 17, 27-30 supra. Such a
view is oversimplified: If workers at the turn of the century were getting their
proper distributional share of the national wealth, they would have been in a
position to buy private insurance against the risks of employment and thus would
not have been "impoverished" by the tort system. See note 42 supra.
It might be argued in response, however, that no matter how wealthy workers
are, they will not invest the appropriate amount of money in accident protection. If
this argument is based on the paternalistic assumption that workers are incapable of
recognizing their own best interests with respect to accident protection, then it is
possible that the tort system did impoverish workers. The argument that workers
will not invest the appropriate amount of money in accident protection can also be
based on the view that the failure of workers to obtain accident insurance imposes
on third parties undesirable externalities such as "crime, insanity, and all other
forms of social evils." NONET, supra note 25, at 18 (citing a Chairman of the
Industrial Accident Commission in 1914). See generally note 29 supra. In either
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alloted under each system. 6 6 Thus, there is a resulting tension

between the remedies afforded to employees under workers' compensation and those that are available to consumers under strict
products liability. 67 This tension manifests itself whenever an employee is injured by a defective product. In attempting to determine
whether such an employee should be compensated under workers'
compensation, strict products liability, or some combination of the
two, there are competing principles of fairness that must be concase, it is not clear why the goal of providing adequate accident protection for
workers required the alteration of the liability rules applicable to the employment
relation. Social insurance against work accidents might have sufficed. See note 30
supra.
66. Readers would be well advised to regard with skepticism the tendency
to accept any expansion of workmen's compensation as a matter for
congratulation. Over the years, the statutes have been interpreted to accommodate more and more accidents sustained by more and more people
at more and more times and places and under more and more circumstances. This has been a source of pride in the past, but perhaps the time
has arrived to question whether it should remain so. Originally, of course,
any liberalizing of the intolerable strictures of nineteenth century individualism was welcomed. The purpose of compensation was to obviate the
necessity of establishing fault under the complex network of torts doctrines then prevailing. . . . But during the intervening years, the fault
requirement has been disintegrating rapidly. . . .Why should the worker
surrender the blessings of a full and generous recovery in tort? . . . In

short, if bigger andbetter recoveries do indeed mark the road to progress,
the workmen's compensation route may well be one to avoid.
Malone, The Limits of Coverage in Workmen's Compensation-The Dual Requirement Reappraised, 51 N.C.L. REV. 705, 733 (1973). One cannot help but wonder
along with Professor Malone whether work-related injuries would not now be
treated under some tort system of strict liability, with its corresponding tort damage
awards, if workers' compensation had never been established at the turn of the
century.
67. Jeremiah Smith identified in 1914 a tension between the establishment of
workers' compensation and the fault based common law of torts.
If the fundamental general principle of the modern common law of
torts (that fault is requisite to liability) is intrinsically right or expedient, is
there sufficient reason why the legislature should make the workmen's
case an exception to this general principle? On the other hand, if this
statutory rule as to workmen is intrinsically just or expedient, is there
sufficient reason for confining the benefit to workmen alone; is there
sufficient reason for refusing to make this statutory rule the test of the right
of recovery on the part of persons other than workmen when they suffer
hurt without the fault of either party?
Can the statutory discrimination in favor of workmen be supported by
considerations of justice or expediency, which are applicable to workmen
and not equally applicable to some other classes of persons?
Smith, Sequel to Workmen's Compensation Acts, 27 HARV. L. REV. 235, 251
(1914). These questions are even more poignant when strict products liability is
compared with workers' compensation. Jeremiah Smith questioned the wisdom of
applying two different compensation systems based on two different sets of underlying justifications to two different contexts of personal injury. The state of affairs
examined in this Comment poses the additional problem that the justifications or
social values supporting the two compensation systems coincide. In response to
Smith, it was possible to argue that the fault system and workers' compensation
sought to foster different social ends and that because they applied to different
contexts of personal injury, it was perfectly admissible that the measures of
compensation and the standards of liability differed. That line of reasoning cannot
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sidered.6" First, employees and consumers should be comparably
compensated for similar product injuries. 69 Second, employees

should receive equivalent compensation for similar on-the-job in-

juries.7 0 The attempt to follow simultaneously these two principles

of fairness leads to contradiction. In any attempt to ascertain the
appropriate remedy for an employee injured by a defective product,
compensating consumers and employees similarly leads to the conclusion that employees should be allowed a cause of action in strict
be used here because the social values or ends secured by workers' compensation
and strict products liability are essentially the same.
However, it is possible that the realization of the same social ends or values
may require different modes of implementation (e.g., standards of liability and
measures of compensation) in different contexts (e.g., work and product consumption). Thus, a meaningful distinction based on the empirical qualities of the Workplace as opposed to the empirical qualities of product consumption could explain
the convergence of the justifications for the two compensation systems and the
simultaneous divergence of their liability rules and measures of compensation. A
meaningful empirical distinction has yet to be suggested.
68. Professor Fleming James suggests that in situations where alternative or
cumulative remedies are possible (for instance, tort damage awards under strict
products liability and workers' compensation benefits) the number of possible
solutions is limited to a few basic patterns.
The basic patterns, it is submitted, are these:
(1) abolishing one (or more) of the remedies;
(2) compelling claimant to elect one from among the remedies and forego
the others;
(3) allowing the claimant to have the cumulative benefits of two (or more)
remedies;
(4) allowing the 'claimant to pursue both (or all) remedies but limiting his
total recovery to the maximum amount he could recover from a single
source.
James, supra note 62, at 541. James argues that, generally, the fourth solution is the
best. The fourth solution, of course, comports with the present state of the law
governing the employee's rights to compensation where he is injured on the job by a
defective product.
The second solution is not examined in this Comment because election of
remedies frustrates the function of workers' compensation-to provide quick and
certain compensation for work-related injuries. See note 32 supra. Compensation
at common law brings with it several uncertainties, including the possibility of
recovery, the amount, and the defendant's financial status. James, supra note 62, at
543. In addition, election of remedies does not seem to further any of the ends
sought by the imposition of strict products liability. The third solution is not
explored either since the objections raised against the fourth solution also apply to
cumulating remedies. The solution suggested in this Comment involves the abolishment of one of the remedies in certain circumstances. See notes 155-65 & accompanying text infra.
69. The inequity of alloting different measures of compensation to victims
similarly injured was aptly shown in a series of examples which juxtaposed accidents covered under workers' compensation and similar accidents within the domain of a fault-based system of compensation. Smith, Sequel to Workmen's Compensation Acts, 27 HARV. L. REV. 235, 237-39 (1914). Jeremiah Smith was particularly concerned with the fact that whereas employees might be compensated under
workers' compensation, non-employees who had been injured in a similar manner
would be barred from compensation under the fault system. Id. at 252.
70. See note 69 supra.
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products liability. 7' On the other hand, if all employees are to

receive equivalent compensation for similar on-the-job injuries, it
would follow that employees should be denied a cause of action

against the third party manufacturer in strict products liability.72

The present state of the law, as exemplified by workers'

compensation and tort principles in California, favors the principle
that workers and consumers injured by defective products should be
compensated similarly rather, than the principle that all employees
receiving like injuries should receive equivalent compensation.
II.

THE EMPLOYEE'S COMMON LAW CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST
THIRD PARTIES: DESCRIPTION AND PURPOSES

A.

Present State of the Law
In California, the nature of the liability applied under workers'
compensation is prefaced neither on contract nor tort principles, but
rather on the idea of status. 73 The obligation of the employer to
provide workers' compensation benefits and the corresponding right

of the employee to obtain those benefits attach by operation of law
to the employer-employee relation .74 In accordance with the predication of workers' compensation liability on the concept of status,
an employee's right of action against a third party tortfeasor is
preserved. 75
71. This conclusion, of course, assumes that the cause of action in strict
products liability will be retained for consumers. The other alternative is to treat all
product-caused injuries under a no-fault system similar to workers' compensation.
72. Alternatively, this principle of fairness could be satisfied by eliminating
workers' compensation altogether. See note 66 supra.
73. Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418, 423 (1923); Quong Ham
Wah Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 184 Cal. 26, 36, 192 P. 1021, 1025 (1920),
appeal dismissed, 255 U.S. 445 (1921); North Alaska Salmon Co. v. Pillsbury, 174
Cal. 1, 2, 162 P. 93, 93-94 (1916) (cases stating that workers' compensation is based
upon the idea of status); Solari v. Atlas-Universal Serv., Inc., 215 Cal. App. 2d 587,
600, 30 Cal. Rptr. 407, 414 (1st Dist. 1963); Deauville v. Hall, 188 Cal. App. 2d 535,
540, 10 Cal. Rptr. 511, 514 (2d Dist.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 824 (1961); Record v.
Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. America, 103 Cal. App. 2d 434,444, 229 P.2d 851, 857 (1st
Dist. 1951); See generally 2 HANNA, supra note 17, at § 1.05(4).
74.

"'Employer'

includes insurer as defined in this division." CAL. LAB.

CODE § 3850(b) (West 1971). " 'Employee' includes the person injured and any
other person to whom a claim accrues by reason of the injury or death of the
former." CAL. LAB. CODE § 3850(a) (West 1971).

75. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3852 (West 1971).
In tort actions by the employee against third parties, the question as to whether
the employee has received or is entitled to receive workers' compensation benefits
is entirely extraneous to the issue of third party tort liability. In Ferrario v. Conyes,
19 Cal. App. 2d 58, 61, 64 P.2d 975, 976 (1st Dist. 1937), the court states:
Where a workman is injured in the course of his employment by a person
other than his employer, he is entitled to bring an action at law against such
party and he is not to be prejudiced in such action by the fact that he may
be receiving compensation. . . . It is well established in this state that it
is prejudicial misconduct in an action of this type for the opposing party to
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The employer of the injured employee is also entitled to recover at common law against the tortious third party for damages
proximately resulting to the employer from the injury. 76 The employer's cause of action is not derived from the employee's common-law right of action, but is entirely separate. 77 The employer is

not subrogated to the right of the employee,78 but rather his cause of
action is in the nature of indemnity from the third party tortfeasor. 79

bring before the jury the fact that the employee suing a person other than
his employer is entitled to or being paid compensation by his employer.
It has also been held that the employee's right to recover against a third party was
not affected by the fact that the third party was not a stranger, but had entered into
a consensual legal relation with the employer. Baugh v. Rogers, 24 Cal. 2d 200, 214,
148, P.2d 633, 641 (1944).
76. Any employer who pays, or becomes obligated to pay compensation,
or who pays, or becomes obligated to pay salary in lieu of compensation,
may likewise make a claim or bring an action against such third person. In
the latter event the employer may recover in the same suit, in addition to
the total amount of compensation, damages for which he was liable including all salary, wage, pension, or other emolument paid to the employee or
to his dependents.
CAL. LAB. CODE § 3852 (West 1971). The employer is given an action against the
tortious third party for two major reasons. See 2 HANNA, supra note 17, at §
24.01(1); LARSON, supra note 1, at §§ 71.00-.20. The employer has either incurred a
loss in compensating the injured employee under workers' compensation, or he
stands to incur such a loss. Id. In addition there is a policy against allowing the
employee a double recovery, one from the employer under workers' compensation
and the other from the third party tortfeasor at common law. Levels v. Growers
Ammonia Supply Co., 48 Cal. App. 3d 443, 121 Cal. Rptr. 779 (5th Dist. 1975); De
Meo v. St. Francis Hosp., 39 Cal. App. 3d 174, 114 Cal. Rptr. 380 (2d Dist. 1974);
Corley v. Workmens' Comp. App. Bd., 22 Cal. App. 3d 447, 99 Cal. Rptr. 242 (4th
Dist. 1971) (recognizing the policy against double recovery by the employee).
If the employer were not given a cause of action against the third party for
recoupment of the workers' compensation benefits he has paid the employee, then
the employee would stand to gain a full tort damage award and workers' compensation benefits in addition. Since tort damages purport to make the victim whole for
his loss, the employee in obtaining both a tort damage award and workers' compensation benefits would be made more than whole for his loss.
77. State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Williams, 38 Cal. App. 3d 218, 223, 112 Cal.
Rptr. 226, 228 (2d Dist. 1974). For a discussion of the ways in which an employer
may recoup his losses from a third party, see CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 3850-3864 (West
1971); Note, Recovery from a Third Party Under California Workmen's Compensation: Guidelines for Legislative Change, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 710 (1966).
78. Because the employee and the employer do not always stand on the same
footing with respect to recovery from a third party (e.g., the employer may have
been contributorily negligent, but not the employee), grave difficulties have emerged in the awarding of damages or in settlement proceedings. See, Note, Recovery
from a Third Party Under California Workmen's Compensation: Guidelines for
Legislative Change, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 710 (1966); Note, Workmen's Compensation
and Third Party Suits in the Aftermath of Witt v. Jackson, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 661
(1970); Comment, Workmen's Compensation: The Impact of the Witt v. Jackson
Rule on the Law of Third Party Settlements, 17 UCLA L. REV. 651 (1970). For a
recent discussion of the status of a concurrently negligent employer in relation to
recovery of compensation payments against a third party, see Mitchell, Products
Liability, Workmen's Compensation and the Industrial Accident, 14 DUQ. L. REV.
349 (1976).
79. Situations where both the employer and the third party negligently cause
injury to the employee pose interesting riddles. To exempt the employer from
funding any part of the tort damages paid by the third party to the employee may
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Purposes of Third Party Action in General
Several theoretical justifications have been offered for allow-

ing an employee to recover damages from a third party tortfeasor in
an action at common law where that employee is also entitled to
benefits under workers' compensation. Because the right of the
employee to sue a third party tortfeasor was settled as a matter of

statutory interpretation in California very early in the history of the
Workmen's Compensation Insurance and Safety Act of 1917,80 the
question has seldom, if ever, been raised by the courts. 8"
Professor Larson 82 advances several justifications for allowing
third party actions. 8 3 He states,
The concept underlying third party actions is the moral
idea that the ultimate loss from wrongdoing should fall
upon the wrongdoer. . . . [E]very mature loss-adjusting
mechanism must look in two directions: it must make the
injured person whole, and it must also seek out the true
wrongdoer whenever possible. While compensation law, in
its social legislation aspect is almost entirely preoccupied
with the former function, it is 84
not so devoid of moral
content as to overlook the latter.
cast an unfair burden on the third party. On the other hand, to force both the
employer and the third party to participate in the financing of the tort damage award
to the employee would seem to reintroduce negligence concepts in the workers'
compensation system, thereby violating the employer's immunity from common
law suit under the exclusive remedy clause. See note 33 supra.
It has been suggested that where both the employer and the third party negligently cause injury to the employee, then the common law recovery of the employee from the third party should be reduced by the "percentage of negligence" of the
employer. The employee's award of workers' compensation benefits from the
employer would likewise be reduced by the percentage of negligence of the third
party. For instance, assume that an injured worker is entitled to $4,000 in workers'
compensation benefits and $20,000 in tort damages. The employer is 75% negligent
and the third party is 25% negligent. In such a case, the injured worker would be
entitled to $3,000 in workers' compensation benefits and $5,000 in tort damage
awards. Davis, Third-Party Tortfeasors'Rights Where Compensation-Covered Employers are Negligent-Where Do Dole and Sunspan Lead?, 4 HOFSTRA L. REV.
571 (1976).
80. 1917 Cal. Stats. ch. 586 (repealed 1937); see Western States Gas & Elec.
Co. v. Bayside Lumber Co., 182 Cal. 140, 148, 187 P. 735, 737 (1920); Stackpole v.
Pacific & Elec. Co., 181 Cal. 700, 703, 186 P. 354, 355 (1919).
81. In a recent case, a third party manufacturer argued on appeal that it was
error for the trial court to allow an employer who was at fault to recover his loss
from payment of workers' compensation benefits from one who was liable without
fault pursuant to strict products liability theories. After stating that the obligation of
an employer to pay benefits to an employee under workers' compensation does not
establish fault on the part of the employer, the court said, "We are given no
authority and we see no reason why an employer cannot proceed against a third
party on the basis that such party also is liable without fault (i.e. negligence)."
Lewis v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 20 Cal. App. 3d 570, 585, 97 Cal. Rptr.
798, 808 (2d Dist. 1971).
82. See note I supra.
83. LARSON, supra note I. at §§ 71.00-21.
84. LARSON, supra note i, at § 71.10.
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In this apology for third party actions, there are several components deserving of separate examination.
1. Placing the Costs of Injury on the Responsible Party
One of Larson's arguments for third party actions is that the
costs of injury should be placed on the responsible party and that
tort actions against third parties presumably fulfill this objective.
Standing alone, this policy provides insufficient grounds for allowing an employee to recover tort damages from a third party tortfeasor. To suggest that the costs of the injury should be borne by the
responsible party begs the issue unless the parameters of such costs
are delimited: The costs of the injury could be measured either in
terms of workers' compensation benefits or tort damages. 85 One
could argue that placing the costs of injury on the responsible party
should entail only that the third party tortfeasor indemnify the
employer for his payment of workers' compensation benefits to the
injured employee.' On such a premise, the costs of injury would
indeed be placed on the responsible party, the third party tortfeasor,
but he would only be liable to the extent of workers' compensation
benefits, not for the full measure of tort damages.
a. The Bargain Trade-Off Model. The basic dilemma that arises when one attempts to determine the costs of an employee's
injury can perhaps be clarified by an example. At present, if
employee A loses his hand in machinery manufactured by a third
party, he may be entitled to recover tort damages from the third
party manufacturer. If employee B is injured by his own employer's
product, employee B's exclusive remedy will be workers' compensation benefits, despite the fact that the accident produced the
identical injury occurring in the same manner from the same type of
machinery.8 7 Professor Larson would presumably justify this discrepancy on the grounds that while the actual cost of the injury is in
either case the full measure of tort damages, employee B had
85. Depending, of course, on what measure of compensation is used, tort
damages or workers' compensation, the determination of what are the costs of
injury will differ.
86. Professor O'Connell has in fact suggested that a statute be passed making
workers' compensation the employee's sole remedy even where the employee is
injured by a third party tortfeasor. According to Professor O'Connell's suggestion, the employer would be able to recoup his expenditures in payment of workers'
compensation benefits from third party tortfeasors. O'Connell, An Immediate
Solution to Some Products Liability Problems: Workers' Compensation as a Sole
Remedy for Employees, with an Employer's Remedy Against Third Parties, 1976
INS. L.J. 683.

87. Balido v. Improved Mach., Inc., 29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 650, 105 Cal.
Rptr. 890, 902 (2d Dist. 1972) (Compton, J., concurring and dissenting). In terms of
law, this is an entirely predictable result because § 3601 of the California Labor
Code makes workers' compensation benefits the employee's only claim against his
employer. But in terms of policy, the result is perplexing since there is no indication
that the manufacturer-consumer relation is altered by the fact that the manufacturer
is also an employer and that the consumer is his employee. For arguments suggest-
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"traded" his claim to full tort damages against the employer for the

benefits of a speedy no-fault compensation plan. By contrast, "between the employee and the stranger there has been no such give
and take, no such compromise struck." 88
The idea of a bargain trade-off or exchange of rights between
employee and employer is frequently used to rationalize the basic
no-fault liability rules governing workers' compensation and to
delimit the scope of their application. 89 According to this view, the
employee exchanges his right to a common-law remedy against the

employer for a speedy no-fault compensation plan which imposes
certain, albeit limited, liability on the employer.
b. Criticism of the BargainTrade-Off Model. Workers' com-

pensation attaches by law to the employer-employee relation as a
result of the status of that relation.9" In adopting the no-fault liability
rules of workers' compensation, the states have thus designated
employers and employees for special treatment. 9 If one seeks to
justify the special liability rules applicable to the employment relation, however, it is not sufficient merely to assess the value of the
equities exchanged by the employer and employee under workers'92
compensation; one must also consider the equities of third parties.

Allowing the employee's common-law cause of action against third
ing that the employee be allowed to sue his employer when that employer is acting
in a non-employer role, see Mitchell, supra note 78, at 355-61; Comment, Workmen's Compensation and Employer Suability: The Dual Capacity Doctrine, 5 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 818 (1974). The California Supreme Court has to some extent recognized the dual capacity doctrine, allowing an employee to pursue a common-law
tort action against his employer when the employer is acting in a non-employer role.
Duprey v. Shane, 39 Cal. 2d 781, 249 P.2d 8 (1952). In a recent case, however, an
employee covered by workers' compensation sought to recover from his employer
under strict products liability. The court held, "Here there is no allegation that
Wallace Brothers [employer] manufactured spraying machines as a business enterprise separate from that employing plaintiff Williams. Rather, the complaint shows
that the firm created the machine for use by its own employees in its own production or service operations." Williams v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 50 Cal. App. 3d
116, 121, 123 Cal. Rptr. 812, 814 (3d Dist. 1975). The implication is that if the
employer had manufactured the injury causing product for sale to the public, the
employee might have had a common-law cause of action against his employer.
88. LARSON, supra note 1, at § 71.20.
89. See, e.g., O'Connell, supra note 12, at 441; Ramos & Smith, Exclusive
Remedy Under Workers'CompensationLaws, 25 FED'N INS. COUNSEL Q. 383, 38990 (1975); Comment, Employee or Independent Contractor: The Need for a Reassessment of the Standard Used Under Calfornia's Workmen's Compensation, 10
U.S.F.L. REV. 133, 152-53 (1975).
90. See notes 73-75 & accompanying text supra.
91. See note 67 supra.
92. One would not have to be concerned with the equities of third parties to
the same extent if workers' compensation were truly a contract, the result of free
bargaining. When two rational parties form a contract, a certain legitimacy to the
arrangement created is presumed. The law does not usually ask whether there are
any parties missing from the contract arrangement who would rationally have been
included or rationally would have wanted to be included. When, however, the state
imposes laws to govern a particular relation (such as employee-employer) and when
a social contract type of argument is asserted to support these rules, one must be
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parties cannot be rationalized on the grounds that no bargain has

been struck between the employee and the third party; in terms of
social contract reasoning the question is precisely whether the state

should "strike" such a bargain when enacting a workers' compensation statute.93 Thus, the initial weakness of the social contract
analogy lies in its a priori assumption that employees and employers are the only parties with an interest in the social contract. 9 4

Another objection to the social contract analogy is that once the
parties to the "contract"

are designated a priori, it is facile to

conclude that the exchange of rights accomplished by workers'
compensation is fair. 95 The ease with which the social contract
analogy can be used to justify the exchange of equities under
workers' compensation underscores a second flaw in the social
contract argument. The bargain trade off model relies heavily on the

intuitive realization that the exchange of equities between employer
and employee under workers' compensation is just to both parties.
Although the exchange of equities which has occurred under the

present workers' compensation system is perhaps just, it cannot be

considered the only acceptable exchange. 96 Because a social conconcerned not just with the fairness of the exchange between the parties, but also
with whether there are parties missing from the arrangement who ought to have
been included. See note 67 supra.
93. See note 92 supra.
94. See note 67 supra. Hanna does suggest, however, that the public benefits
from the establishment of workers' compensation. 2 ,HANNA, supra note 17, at
§ 1.05(8)(d).
95. The crucial step in the bargain trade-off argument is the recognition that
the exchange of rights and liabilities between employer and employee effectuated
by workers' compensation is a fair exchange. One is perhaps tempted to conclude
that the exchange is fair simply by virtue of the fact that both employer and
employee have gained as well as relinquished rights and liabilities. Such a conclusion is not justified, however: To say that the exchange is fair, it is necessary to
place values on what the employer and employee have gained and what they have
lost by the establishment of workers' compensation. It is not readily apparent how
this valuation of the equities is to be accomplished..
The language of the bargain trade-off serves to obscure: If truly there had been
an exchangi between employer and employee regarding rights and liabilities for
workplace accidents, the arrangement adopted would have a presumption of legitimacy to the extent the parties voluntarily entered into the exchange. Here, however, the state merely imposed a new set of rights and liability rules for workplace
injuries. The bargain trade-off model thus relies on the practice of voluntary
contracts to justify a state imposed arrangement-workers' compensation-when
in fact no voluntary bargain has been struck between the employer and employee.
96. If one assumes that tort damages function to make the injured victim
whole, then the value of incurring an injury and'receiving tort damages (administrative costs aside) is equal to the value of not incurring the injury at all. Under
workers' compensation, the employee exchanges his right to full compensation in
return for a speedy no-fault compensation plan. Once the employee finds he has
incurred an injury that would normally (apart from the dictates of workers' compensation) be compensable at common law, the value of incurring the injury and
receiving workers' compensation benefits is clearly less than the value of not
incurring the injury at all. The employee would by far prefer not incurring the
injury. Yet since the "bargain trade-off" of workers' compensation takes place at a
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tract perspective can therefore be utilized to justify a number of

possible arrangements for workers' compensation, the original bargain trade-off can be reformulated endlessly to accommodate
changes in the rights and liabilities of the employee or employer.97
Professor Larson's "social contract" argument has been attacked directly on the grounds that the present policy of allowing
employees to sue third parties at common law violates the initial
exchange of equities. 98 Professor O'Connell argues that allowing
employees to sue the employer's suppliers at common law in effect
subjects the employer to common-law liability; the employer is
increasingly forced to defray the costs of such common law liabil-

ity 9 since a third party product manufacturer, faced with the prospect of suits by or on behalf of injured employees, frequently seeks

to recover that cost either directly from the employer by means of
indemnity agreements,' ° or indirectly by passing on the cost of
product liability insurance through increased product prices. The
result is that "in addition to paying workers' compensation benefits,
the employer increasingly pays the equivalent of common-law lia-

bility reflected in increased costs of machinery or indemnity agreehigher level of generality (i.e., before the employee knows that he is the one who
will be injured by a negligent employer), it is problematic in an economic sense to
determine the values of the exchanges in the initial "bargain trade-off." Is the
employee's release of his right to common law remedies against the employer in
return for a speedy no-fault compensation plan fair? Or is the employee making "a
good deal" such that he would be willing to give something more (e.g., common law
rights against certain third parties) in exchange for the no-fault plan? Economic
theory does not clarify the issue here because the "bargain" has in fact been
imposed by the state.
97. To give one example of the "reformulation of the initial bargain," in 1959,
an amendment was passed in California which restricted the employee's right of
action against a negligent co-employee. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 3601 (West 1971).
Concerning this employee immunity, Larson writes,
The reason for the employer's immunity is the quid pro quo by which the
employer gives up his normal defenses and assumes automatic liability,
while the employee gives up his right to common-law verdicts. This reasoning can be extended to the tortfeasor co-employee; he, too, is involved
in this compromise of rights. Perhaps, so the argument runs, one of the
things he is entitled to expect in return for what he has given up is freedom
from common-law suits based on industrial accidents in which he is at
fault."
LARSON, supra note 1, at § 72.20.
98. O'Connell, supra note 12, at 440-41.
99. Id.
100. Under these indemnity agreements the employer contracts to "reimburse
the third party manufacturer for the costs of common law liability which the third
party incurs as a result of injuries he inflicts on the employer's employees." In
Baugh v. Rogers, 24 Cal. 2d 200, 148 P.2d 633 (1944), Mr. Justice Traynor argued
that to allow an employee to sue a third party in tort would be contrary to the policy
and provisions of workmen's compensation law if the effect of such suit is to
indirectly place the burden of common-law damages on the employer. Id. at 21819; 148 P.2d at 643-44 (Traynor, J., dissenting). For an example of a case where a
third party tortfeasor was able to recover from an employer for losses incurred in a
tort suit by the employer's employee under an indemnification agreement, see Ryan
Stevedoring Co. v. Pan Atlantic SS Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956). The Ryan case was
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ments with his capital goods supplier.""°' Accordingly, Professor
O'Connell argues that the original bargain trade-off between employer and employee has been broken, at least economically, if not
legally. 02 Apparently, O'Connell focuses his attention on protecting the employer, the third party, and perhaps employees in general
at the expense of the employee injured by a third party, 0 3 whereas
Larson favors protecting the employee injured by the tortious conduct of a third party, and perhaps employees in general, at the
expense of the employer and the third party. " Since these two

positions conflict and since there is no apparent reason to prefer one
over the other, an acceptable principle has yet to be found by which
it can be decided whether to impose the limited costs of workers'

compensation benefits or more extensive tort damages on the third
party tortfeasor.
2. Blameworthiness
One of the suggested rationalia for placing the full costs of a

tort damages award on a third party tortfeasor turns on the element
of blameworthiness. If the third party is considered to be a wrongdoer, then "to reduce his burden because of the relation between the

employer and the employee would be a windfall to him which he
has done nothing to deserve."'

05

This view encompasses two posi-

silenced by congressional action. See Longshoremen's & Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), as amended by Act of
October 27, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-576, 86 Stat. 1251; see LARSON, supra note 1, at
§§ 76.10-.53; O'Connell, supra note 12, at 444-51.
101. O'Connell, supra note 12, at 441.
102. Professor O'Connell argues that because the third party's liability costs
are being passed on to the employer, the employer is incurring the costs of commonlaw liability. In effect, O'Connell suggests that there is a cost equivalency between
the employee's recovery against the third party and the increased costs the employer must pay when he purchases from the third party. The fact of a cost equivalency,
however, cannot alone demonstrate that the original bargain between employer and
employee has been broken. There can be no doubt that allowing the employee to
recover a common-law judgment against a supplier of the employee's employer will
raise the employer's costs closer to the level of common-law liability. But one can
just as easily say that employers in buying defective equipment from capital goods
suppliers impose on themselves the costs of common-law liability for product
related injuries. Indeed, both interpretations satisfy the "but for" concept of
causation. See PROSSER, supra note 9, at 238-41. Thus, although allowing employee
suits against third party suppliers satisfies the "but for" concept of causation with
regard to employers incurring the costs of common law liability, it would seem that
satisfaction of the "but for" test is not sufficient for safely concluding that the
original bargain has been broken. The only way one can arrive at O'Connell's
conclusion that the original bargain has been broken on the basis of the "but for"
concept of causation would be to define the original bargain as follows: In return for
a no-fault plan, the employee will take no legal action with respect to an injury
arising out of and in the course of employment which may raise the costs of the
employer by an amount approaching the costs that the employer would incur if the
employee were allowed to recover common-law damages from the employer. This
is not a terribly convincing formulation of the original bargain.
103. See note 86 supra.
104. See notes 83-84 & accompanying text supra.
105.

LARSON, supra note 1, at § 71.20.
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tions: First, the third party tortfeasor should not escape the full brunt
of tort liability cost. simply because of the fortuitous circumstance
that the injured party happens to be a worker covered by workers'
compensation. Second, workers' compensation benefits are not the

adequate measure of blame. 106 The characterization of the third

party's conduct as blameworthy might in some circumstances justify the transfer of greater costs to the third party than if that party's
conduct were not wrongful. 0 7 Such reasoning, however, is not
applicable to third party actions based on strict products liability,
since blameworthiness is not an underlying rationale of strict products liability. 08
3. Deterrence
The concern with granting the third party tortfeasor a windfall,
which would result if the employee were precluded from suing the
third party in tort, does not stem solely from adherence to the notion
of blameworthiness. The concept of deterrence is also relevant.' 09
In contrast to tort damages, workers' compensation benefits do
not purport to make the injured employee whole for his loss. '10 If a
manufacturer's cost-benefit choice can be described as a choice
between incurring the costs of present tort damages or eliminating

the accident costs through greater care in production and quality
control or further research, it follows that an increase in liability
costs will produce a greater incentive to accident avoidance.''
106. 2 HANNA, supra note 17, at § 1.05(5).
107. In other words, a finding that the injurious act of the third party was
morally wrongful would demand less protection of his interests and more compensation for the victim. It is perhaps on similar grounds that common law suits by
employees are allowed against the employer if the employer committed an intentional assault. See LARSON, supra note 1, at §§ 68.00-.35. Most workers' compensation statutes allow such common law suits. In California there is allowed an
increase in the award under workers compensation by one half the amount of the
compensation otherwise recoverable, but not to exceed $10,000. CAL. LAB. CODE
§ 4553 (West 1971). In State Dept. of Corrections v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 5
Cal. 3d 885, 890, 97 Cal. Rptr. 786, 789, 489 P.2d 818, 821 (1971), the court stated,
with regard to § 4553, "[Tlhe employee does not receive more than full compensation for his injuries. Thus the increased award is not a penalty in the sense of being
designed primarily to punish the defendant rather than to more adequately compensate the plaintiff."
108. Strict products liability applies to the seller of a defective product even
though "the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(2)(a) (1965). See notes 46-82 &
accompanying text supra.
109. In every legal loss distribution mechanism, there are two things to be
accomplished: first to make the victim whole, and second to see to it as far
as possible that the ultimate loss falls on the actual wrongdoer, as a matter
of simple ethics and as a deterrent to harmful conduct.
LARSON, supra note 1, at § 70.20.
110. LARSON, supra note 1, at § 2.50.
111. Under contemporary economic theory, '[An enterprise will take safety
measures to avoid accidents only where the cost of such measures is less than the
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Conversely, a decrease in liability costs will decrease the incentive
to avoid accidents. Therefore, the deterrent value of placing the cost
of the injury on a third party would vary depending upon whether

the third party were made responsible only for the cost of workers'
compensation benefits or for tort damages.
It follows that if the costs of liability for a third party manufacturer are reduced to the value of workers' compensation benefits,

the incentive for product safety research and development will have
been lessened for third party manufacturers. As will be seen in the
following examination of the deterrent effects of denying tort re-

coveries against third party manufacturers, the reduction of the
safety incentive among third party manufacturers is not necessarily
undesirable. Because these effects differ depending upon whether
the products are industrial goods or consumer goods, separate
analysis of such goods is required." 2
a. Industrial Goods. In relation to industrial goods, the
denial of tort recoveries by employees against third parties implies

that employees will be exposed to a greater level of risk of injury
than if these tort recoveries were allowed."

3

Because industrial

goods impose risks of injury almost exclusively on employees," 4 it
is difficult to determine the desired level of deterrence to impose on
the third party tortfeasor."5 The risks posed by defective industrial
goods are typical of the employment.
potential accident cost." Ursin, Strict Liability for Defective Business PremisesOne Step Beyond Rowland and Greenman, 22 UCLA L. REV. 820, 829 n.40 (1974).
112. The term "industrial goods" refers to those goods typically used in the
particular type of employment (e.g., a printing press in publishing, a hammer in
carpentry, a car in the taxi business). Note that what might be taken as a consumer
good, such as bourbon or scotch, may nevertheless be an industrial good in a certain
type of employment-bartending. Although it is perhaps difficult to distinguish
between consumer products and industrial goods, such a distinction is not infeasible
and the courts have been called upon to make this distinction before. See note 155
infra.
113. The proposition holds if it is assumed that the number of suits against third
parties remains constant whether the suits are merely employers' suits for the
recovery of workers' compensation benefits paid out or for the full extent of tort
damages. The proposition is even more convincing when it is realized that a person
who stands to recover tort damages is willing to incur greater administrative costs
than someone who is seeking indemnity to recover the value of workers' compensation benefits. If workers' compensation payments are sufficiently low, there will be
instances where the employer will not want to sue the third party tortfeasor because
administrative costs will become prohibitive.
114. See note 112 supra.
115. The difficulty lies in the fact that the risks posed by defective industrial
goods are just as much risks which are part of the employer's enterprise as other
risks common to the employer's business, and these other risks are covered exclusively by workers' compensation. Are there any good reasons why risks posed by
defective industrial products should be isolated for the application of a tort damages
level of deterrence and not other risks common to the employer's business? Indeed,
if the justifications for recovery under strict products liability are so similar to the
justifications for workers' compensation, why should there be two different ways
of measuring the level of deterrence to be applied?
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It would seem that there is little reason to deter these risks
more than other risks common to employment. It might be decided
as a matter of policy that employees as a class should be exposed to
the least amount of product-related risks, 16 in which case tort
recoveries should be allowed against third parties." 1 7 But the contrary position could also be advanced on the policy that American
8 Alterenterprise should be protected from burdensome liabilities. "1

natively, the concept of deterrence might be combined with the
moral element of blameworthiness, resulting in the interventionistic

approach of discouraging blameworthy actions as much as possible9
by holding the third party manufacturer liable for tort damages."
To the extent that the concept of deterrence is associated with that of
blameworthiness, it necessarily fails to provide a rationale for third

party actions based on strict products liability. 120
b.

Consumer Goods.

The search for the appropriate level

of deterrence to apply to third party manufacturers is more complex

when the employee is injured by a defective consumer product than
when he is injured by a defective industrial good. With respect to
consumer products used by employees, the denial of employee tort

recoveries against third parties would result in both employees and
consumers receiving less safety protection than if the product were

used solely by consumers.' 2 ' Thus, to the extent that tort recoveries
by employees are prohibited, it is likely that consumers (as well as
employees) will incur more injuries because it will not be worthwhile for the manufacturer to avoid product related accidents.' 22 To

116. It might be argued that employees are entitled to be protected from risks
posed by defective products to the same extent as consumers. This answer begs the
question since workers are in fact not given the same extent of protection as nonemployees from a whole series of risks which fall under the exclusive remedy
clause of the workers' compensation acts. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 3600 (West 1971).
From the perspective of deterrence, the question is whether the risks posed by
defective industrial products are more properly dealt with under the level of deterrence afforded by the tort system or by the level of deterrence afforded by workers'
compensation. See also text accompanying note 150 infra (Different levels of
deterrence applied to the same or similar risks prevent the potential victim from
accurately assessing the risks and taking preventive measures. This is a cost which
cannot be neglected.).
117.

LARSON, supra note 1, at § 72.50.

118. See O'Connell, supra note 12, at 435-441 , text accompanying note 103
supra.
119. See notes 105-07 & accompanying text supra.
120. This failure is evident because blameworthiness alone fails to provide a
rationale for third party actions based on strict products liability. See notes 54-62 &
accompanying text supra.
121. If employees are denied tort recoveries for product injuries, it follows that
the deterrent value placed on the third party manufacturer is less than if the only
users of the product are consumers who can sue for tort damages. The lessening of
the deterrent value placed on the third party manufacturer implies that it will be
worthwhile for him to allow more product injuries to occur. See note 122 infra.
122. An increase in product related accidents may be cause for concern if
workers' compensation statutes do not provide for benefits sufficient to encourage
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the extent that one assumes that damages make the injured party
whole, such a result is not problematic from the perspective of
consumers since they will still be able to recover such damages.' 2 3

The problem is more acute for employees: From their perspective, a
more extensive tort damage level of deterrence to risks posed by
defective consumer products is desirable. Defective consumer prod-

ucts present risks which are often uncharacteristic of employment
and which the employee, like the consumer, cannot easily avoid or
insure against. Accordingly, with respect to employee injuries from
consumer goods, it makes sense to treat the employee like a con-

sumer. 124
4.

Protection of the Worker
Another argument "in favor of retaining some opportunity

for recovery against third persons lies in the fact that the compen-25

sation acts are designed to protect the worker and his family."
According to this view, because workers' compensation benefits are

optimal expenditures on safety research and accident prevention by employers. On
the adequacy of workers' compensation benefits for this objective, see Berkowitz
& Burton, Objectives Other Than Income Maintenance for Workmen's Compensation, 38 J. RISK & INS. 343 (1971). Burton and Berkowitz argue that workers'
compensation benefits are so low that perhaps employers are not investing in
sufficient accident prevention programs. Id. at 349. By extension, if the third party
manufacturers were to be made liable only for workers' compensation benefits,
there would be insufficient expenditure by third party manufacturers for productsafety research. The whole process can be described in this way: There are 200
users of a product made by manufacturer A. One hundred of these users are
employees of manufacturer B and one hundred of the users are simply consumers.
The 200 are all allowed to sue at common law for product injuries from A's product.
A has reached the point where an additional dollar spent on further research or
safety precautions will reduce his liability for damages by one dollar. This is the
equilibrium point where the marginal cost of further research is equal to the
marginal revenue of further research. If now the one hundred users who are
employees. are denied the right to sue the third party manufacturer, A, in tort, and
only the employer of the one hundred employees sues A for recovery of workers'
compensation payments, it follows that A's liability costs will go down. Accordingly, A will realize that he is spending too much money trying to avoid liability costs
and consequently, he will abandon his more costly safety measures and decrease
his research expenditures. As a result, the total number of accidents incurred by the
200 will go up. More employees will be injured, but they will recover only the value
of workers' compensation benefits. Although more consumers will also be injured,
they will still recover the same measure of tort damages as before. A new equilibrium point will be reached when the manufacturer expends as much for additional
safety measures as these additional measures bring in by way of reducing liability
costs.

123. The primary notion underlying compensation "is that of repairing plaintiff's injury or of making him whole as nearly as that may be done by an award of
money." F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 25.1, at 1301 (1956).
124. The argument relating to industrial goods clearly does not apply to consumer goods. See note 115 supra.
125. McCoid, supra note 3, at 401. The provisions of the workers' compensation act "shall be liberally construed by the courts with purpose of extending their
benefits for the protection of persons injured in the course of their employment."
CAL. LAB. CODE § 3202 (West 1971).
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not designed to make the employee whole, the injured employee
should not be restricted to workers' compensation remedies
whenever he can be made whole by a common-law recovery against
26
a third party tortfeasor.1
If, however, the goal sought to be achieved is to protect
workers, it may be that the money currently used to finance com-

mon law damages for workers injured by third party tortfeasors
could be more effectively utilized. 127 In cases where the third party
tortfeasor, for instance, a product manufacturer, passes on the cost
of common-law liability to the employer,

28

a reduction in such

costs accompanied by a commensurate increase in the value of
workers' compensation benefits might be more beneficial to workers than simply allowing workers to sue third parties for tort damages. 129 In other words, it does not follow that the policy of protecting workers dictates that employees be allowed to sue third parties
at common law.
The view that a worker should be afforded the protection of a
common-law cause of action against tortious third parties seems also
126. McCoid, supra note 3, at 401-02.
127. Professor O'Connell suggests that product liability suits by employees (as
well as consumers presumably) are monstrously inefficient. See O'Connell, supra
note 12, at 441-44.
128. A product manufacturer who supplies an employer with.goods definitely
falls within the category of tortfeasors who are able to pass costs on to the
employer.
Where the third party tortfeasor has no economic relation to the employer, it
may be that allowing employees common-law suits against third parties serves best
to protect the interest of workers. In such cases, the third party cannot pass on the
costs of common-law liability incurred from employee suits to the employer. For
instance, if an employee is injured on the job by a negligent automobile driver, there
is no effective way to transfer the damage award for the injured employee to
employees in general. In other words, where the third party is commercially
unrelated to the employer, the granting of right to employees to sue a third party at
common law can have no economic impact upon the measure of workers' compensation benefits. Where the third party passes the costs of common-law liability to
the employer, however, it is possible to reduce damage awards to employees and to
use such savings to increase the measure of workers' compensation benefits for all
employees. See note 129 infra; see also O'Connell, supra note 12, at 435-41.
129. Both workers' compensation and strict products liability are founded in
part upon the risk distribution rationale. Thus, it is clear that a manufacturer passes
on the costs of both his own employees' injuries (the cost of workers' compensation
benefits) and the cost of injuries sustained by the users of his product (tort damage
awards). See note 12 & accompanying text supra. Since in either case the costs are
passed on down the chain of product distribution, it is possible to reduce the
liability costs of a manufacturer for product injuries and to use such savings to
increase the value of workers' compensation benefits without increasing the total
cost imposed on the manufacturer-employer. If such a plan.were implemented it
would have the effect of transferring wealth from workers who are injured by
defective products to workers who are injured by accident risks covered exclusively by workers' compensation. In terms of employee protection from risk of
injury, this plan would increase the risk of injury from defective products and
decrease the risk of injury from those risks attendant to the workplace which are
compensated solely by workers' compensation. See notes 115, 122 supra.
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grounded on the persistent notion that when a worker is injured by
an act which can be characterized as tortious, he is more entitled to
recover common-law damages than a worker who is injured by nontortious conduct. 130 This proposition undercuts the enterprise liability basis of workers' compensation,' 3 1 and tends to favor a social
insurance scheme in which all the common-law rights of employees
against both employers and third parties would be preserved. Furthermore, if the employee who is injured by tortious conduct is
entitled to tort damages from the tortfeasor, then an employee
should not be precluded from suing his own employer. But under
the present state of the law, an employee is precluded from bringing
such a suit. 132 If it is assumed that the employee should not be able
to sue the employer at common law, then an employee injured by
tortious conduct is not necessarily deserving of greater compensation than an employee who is injured by non-tortious conduct.
III.

EMPLOYMENT-RELATED PRODUCT-CAUSED INJURIES:
A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM

This Comment has sought to establish the following propositions: The policy that the responsible party should bear the costs of
injury does not answer the question of which measure of costs,
workers' compensation benefits or tort damages, should be imposed
on that party. 33 Blameworthiness on the part of a tortfeasor suggests that employees be allowed to sue third parties at common
law.' 34 Strict products liability, however, turns neither upon blame
nor wrongdoing; thus blameworthiness does not provide a sufficient
reason to allow the employee to sue the third party in strict products
liability. 135 Deterrence furnishes an effective rationale for permitting employees to maintain common law suits against third party
manufacturers for defective consumer goods, but not for defective
industrial goods. 136 The policy of protecting the workers' interests
130. Mitchell, Products Liability, Workmen's Compensation and the Industrial
Accident, 14 DuQ. L. REV. 349, 355 (1976).

131. The enterprise liability notion suggests that there are necessary and attendant accident costs to the production process, that these costs should be passed on
to the consumer, that the party in the best position to minimize these costs is the
employer, and that the traditional tort concepts of wrongdoing and blame have no
place in the law of the employment relation. The enterprise liability notion is based
on the belief that the identification of the source of injury as negligence of the
employee, co-employee, employer, or as some other source should be of no importance for compensation as long as the injury may properly be chargeable to the
enterprise. Thus, whenever tort constructs are reintroduced to distinguish certain
risks of employment for special treatment from among those risks properly chargeable to the enterprise, the notion of enterprise liability is undercut.
132. See note 2 supra.
133.

See notes 85-104 & accompanying text supra.

134. See notes 105-07 & accompanying text supra.
135. See note 108 & accompanying text supra.
136. See notes 109-24 & accompanying text supra.
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does not necessarily compel allowing employees common-law suits
against third parties. 137

These propositions collectively support the conclusion that
product-related injuries should not, under all circumstances, entitle
the employee to maintain a common-law cause of action for damages on the theory of strict products liability. In contradistinction to
this conclusion, it must be recognized that workers should not be
disadvantaged vis- -vis consumers solely because they are covered
by workers' compensation. Thus, when the victim of a defective
product is an employee covered by workers' compensation, that
victim should not categorically be denied the protection of strict
products liability.
A coherent solution to the problem raised by these conflicting
equity considerations is suggested by Professor Calabresi's analysis
of strict liability rules.1 38 In dealing with the doctrine of strict
liability, Calabresi has developed two liability rule models for
workers' compensation and product injuries. As will be demonstrated, it may make sense to accord different treatment to distinct
classes of employee product injuries.
A.

Two Models: Workers' Compensation and
Strict Products Liability
Professor Calabresi suggests that to promote the goal of
minimizing accident prevention and accident costs, the burden of
liability should be placed on the party to a transaction who is in the
best position to "make the cost-benefit analysis between accident
costs and accident avoidance costs and to act on that decision once it
is made." 3 9 Thus, if the victim is in the best position to make and
implement a cost-benefit analysis, the losses from accident must lie
where they fall; whereas if the tortfeasor is in the best position to
make the cost-benefit analysis and to act upon it, he should be held
to strict liability. 140
Calabresi's approach is not limited to placing the costs of
injury exclusively on either party. According to Calabresi, strict
liability need not be placed entirely on the injurer or on the victim.
Rather, the two parties can share the burden of liability for loss. For
instance, a court might determine that the victim is in the best
position to determine the desirability of avoiding the risks of certain
types of harm. But simultaneously, the court might determine that
137.

See notes 125-32 & accompanying text supra.

138. Calabresi, Optimal Deterrence and Accidents, 84 YALE L.J. 656 (1975);
Calabresi & Hirschoff, Towards a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J.
1055 (1972).
139. Id.at 1060.
140. See note 138 supra.
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the injurer is in the best position to make the cost-benefit analysis
with respect to the occurrence of the accident and the basic damages

flowing from it.'14 According to Calabresi,
the system of workers'
42
compensation provides such an example.
1.

The Workers' Compensation Model
Presumably because of the nature of the employment relation,

Calabresi suggests that the employer is generally in the best position
to decide upon and to implement efficient cost-benefit analysis with
respect to risk imposition on employees and accident avoidance
costs. By contrast, the employee is in the best position to determine
the desirability of avoiding a certain type of injury or damage. 43
' In
support, Calabresi gives the example of a great violinist who works
in a steel mill: If his hand is mangled, the extreme mental suffering
and accompanying economic loss will be his onus, given the
schedules for limited compensation.'"
2.

The Strict Products Liability Model
With respect to product injuries to consumers, the general
principle is that the producer is in the best position to formulate and

implement a cost-benefit analysis.' 45 Calabresi suggests, however,
that concern with questions of abnormal use, adequacy of warning,

and perhaps contributory negligence demonstrates a lack of judicial
certainty underlying the general rule that the producer is the cheapest cost avoider.' l Thus, in situations where the victim can be

identified as a peculiarly risky user, or where the warning seems
adequate, the courts will abandon the general rule that the producer
is the cheapest cost avoider.47
3.

The Implications of the Two Models

Calabresi's models for products liability and workers' compensation suggest guidelines for determining which types of product
141. Calabresi, supra note 138, at 669.
142. Workers' compensation,
tends to divide the decision of who is better suited to evaluate costs and
benefits according to the type of damage rather than type of accident. We
are not here concerned with the fact that workmen's compensation
schedules are hopelessly out of date, but instead with the very fact that
they deal with damages on a scheduled basis. The result is that the measure
of damages for dignitary losses and even wage losses is that of the ordinary
worker doing that job,
instead of being particular to the individual victim. Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra
note 138, at 1068-69.
143. This assumes, of course, that the risks of a particular employment can be
accurately perceived by the employee. Accordingly, Calabresi's workers' compensation model works best when it is applied to those risks which are typical of the
given employment situation.
144. Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 138, at 1068-69.
145. Id. at 1068.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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injuries should be compensated under workers' compensation and
which should be treated under the common law of products liability.
Those classes of product risks which present the threat of a
particular type of loss 48 should be dealt with under the model of
workers' compensation if they are typical risks of employment.
With these types of product risks, the employee is in a good position

to perceive the risk of a specific injury based upon the kind of
injuries that are particular to a given type of employment; and he is
also in the best position to determine the desirability of avoiding that
injury. Furthermore, the employee is in the best position to act on
his cost-benefit analysis by avoiding the risk-creating employment. 149 If the above guidelines are rejected and product risks
typical of the employment relation are compensated under strict
products liability, then the employee's perception of the risks as-

sociated with a certain employment would be clouded, because
some risks typical 'of the employment relation would be fully compensated under strict products liability, whereas similar risks would
be only partially compensated by workers' compensation benefits.' 50 Those classes of product risks that are atypical of the employment are best compensated under the common law of strict
products liability, because the employee is not in the most advan-

tageous position to determine and implement a cost-benefit analysis
of the desirability of avoiding a particular injury. Such risks are not
typical of the employment and therefore cannot easily be perceived

by the employee. In relation to a third party manufacturer, the
employee stands in no better position to assess atypical risks than an
ordinary consumer.
148. Particular types of loss include, for instance, facial disfigurement, asbestosis, loss of hand, and so on.
149. The voluntariness with which an employee can decide which employment
to take and which risks to face, of course, bears on the question of whether he is in
the best position to implement the cost-benefit analysis. Thus, if an employee has
virtually no choice in deciding which employment to take, there is serious doubt as
to whether he is really in the best position to implement the cost-benefit analysis.
As Calabresi notes, however, the determination of whether potential victims are in
the best position to act upon a cost-benefit analysis is not to be made on an
individual basis, but at the more general level of categories. See Calabresi &
Hirschoff, supra note 138, at 1070.
In workers' compensation, the original decision as to who is the cheapest cost
avoider was legislatively made. Id. at 1068. Once it is accepted that the employee is
in the best position to avoid risks of specific injuries normally compensated under
workers' compensation law, it follows a fortiori that the worker is in the best
position to decide whether to avoid certain types of employment which present
risks of product caused injuries that are typical of the employment.
150. If the injury from a typical risk is caused by the employer, employee or
co-employee, then compensation for the employee would be limited to workers'
compensation benefits. If the source of the risk is a product defect, however, then
full tort compensation can be awarded under strict products liability. See note 11 &
accompanying text supra.
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The distinction between Calabresi's two models is based on the

typicality of the product risk for the given employment situation. 151

It is apparent that those product risks which are typical of an

employment are largely those risks associated with the use of
industrial goods.' 52 Those product risks which are not typical of the
industry are generally linked with the use of consumer goods. The
typicality of risk argument thus coincides with the earlier conclusion

that a tort measure of deterrence is necessary to protect employees
from defective consumer goods, but not from defective industrial
goods. 153
B.

A Legislative Resolution
A legislative scheme can be devised to implement the "typic-

ality of risk" approach: All employee suits in strict products liabili54
ty would be barred where the injury is typical of the employment. 1
For the bar to apply, two prongs of the test for typicality must be
satisfied. First, the injury causing product must be one which is
typically used in the employment situation.' 55 Second, the harm
which results from the injury must also be typical of the employ151. The idea that injuries from risks attendant to the enterprise should be
compensated under workers' compensation and that injuries from risks which are
not typical of the employment situation be treated under tort law is not new. Cf. A.
EHRENZWEIG, NEGLIGENCE WITHOUT FAULT 48-64 (1951) (discussing the applica-

tion of a typicality test of causation for strict liability). This "typicality of risk"
analysis has even been suggested, perhaps erroneously, as one of the rationales for
allowing the employee's common-law action against third parties.
It may be argued that while many industrial or commercial accidents are
typical of the enterprise in which the worker is employed, it is not always
true that accidents which occur through the intervention of someone outside the employment relation should be classified as 'typical' or inherent
risks of the enterprise.
McCoid, supra note 3, at 398. It is interesting that the one example McCoid
presents to describe a risk typical to a given employment has to do with a defective
product supplied by a third party. !d. It is likewise interesting that Professor
Calabresi, in explaining his workers' compensation model, uses the example of a
violinist in a steel mill. The risk of losing a hand is made clear by the type of
machinery used in that type of employment. Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 138,
at 1069.
152. See note 112 supra.
153. See notes 109-24 & accompanying text supra.
154. There is a certain problem in defining the parameters of the relevant
employment. Is the relevant employment community one of all employees working
under one employer? Or should the employment community be defined more
narrowly-such as all secretaries working for one employer or all machinists
working for the same employer? Cf. Fletcher, Fairnessand Utility in Tort Theory,
85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 572 (1972) (Professor Fletcher discusses this problem with
respect to the level of concreteness desired in implementing his paradigm of
reciprocity). See also Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 138, at 1067 (Calabresi
suggests that the greatest differences among the various areas of strict products
liability concern the level of generality for making the determination of who is the
cheapest cost avoider).
155. The determination of whether the defective product is one of a kind
typically used in the employment situation calls for a distinction between industrial
goods and consumer goods. See note 112 infra. It is not unreasonable to expect that
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ment. If either of these conditions fail, the injured employee would
be allowed to pursue his cause of action against the third party
manufacturer under the doctrine of strict products liability. In any
case, the employer must be allowed to recover his expenditures for
workers' compensation payments from the third party manufacturer. 156
It might be argued against this scheme that the determination
of whether an injury is typical of the employment calls for exceedingly complex and arbitrary distinctions. There is no reason to
suppose, however, that such determinations are more problematic
than other issues faced by the courts in the domain of workplace
injuries. The "typicality of risk" approach is essentially a judgement of causation. It calls for the determination of whether a given
product injury falls within the scope of risks attendant to the workplace. Varying types of causation tests have been developed to
perform the function of attributing injuries to enterprises. 157 The
the courts will be able to make such a distinction: the recently enacted MagnusonMoss Warranty Act demands that courts make the determination that a particular
good is a consumer good before the substantive warranty provisions of the Act can
apply. A consumer product under that Act is defined as one "which is normally
used for personal, family, or household purposes." Magnuson-Moss Act of 1974,
§ 101(1), 15 U.S.C. § 2301(1) (Supp. V 1975). The term "consumer good" is also
used in the UCC. U.C.C. § 9-109(1). Many of the so-called "Baby FTC Acts"
which prohibit "unfair and deceptive practices" apply exclusively to consumer
goods and thus also call for judicial determination of what constitutes consumer
goods. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 24-5-0.5-2(1) (1974); OHiO REV. CODE ANN. § 1309.07
(Page 1976); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-13.1-7 (1969); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-1 1-3(2) (1977
Supp.); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2451(a)-(b) (1977 Supp.).
Nevertheless, it may be difficult for courts to determine whether an injury was
engendered by a consumer good or an industrial good. The courts could, of course,
make individual determinations of whether particular products fall into the class of
industrial goods or consumer goods. The problem with such an approach is that
such concrete determinations are expensive in terms of court costs, litigation
expenses, and uncertainty as to the state of the law. Cf. Calabresi & Hirschoff,
supra note 138, at 1067-69. (applying a general rule minimizes the administrative
costs, but imposes other costs in that it may fail to carry out the substantive policy
faithfully).
This problem of determining the appropriate level of generality in formulating a
liability rule is also present with respect to the determination of the appropriate
definition of the employment situation. See note 154 infra. If the courts are forced
to engage in particularized determinations of what constitutes an employment
community, litigation expenses and uncertainty costs are likely to be great. On the
other hand, if sweeping generalizations are utilized to define the employment
situation, the rationalia for the "typicality of risk" approach may be undermined.
156. The employer must be able to recoup his losses in payment of workers'
compensation benefits in order that his employees may be protected by a deterrent
to product defects. See notes 115-21 & accompanying text supra. This conclusion
would be premised on the view that the third party manufacturer is a better risk and
cost avoider than the employer with regard to the basic harms which result to
employees from the use of defective products. See note 139-40 & accompanying
text supra.
157. The test of causation used to determine whether an employee is entitled to
workers' compensation benefits is the "arising out of and in the course of employment" requirement. See LARSON, supra note 1, at §§ 6.00-42.00; 2 HANNA, supra
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fact that courts have developed such tests suggests that the im-

plementation of a new test of causation does not create insurmountable problems.

The test for typicality must insure that the employee be treated,
for purposes of compensation, like a consumer in those instances
where the employee stands in the same position as a consumer with

respect to a defective product.' 58 The test must also guarantee that
the injured employee be treated no differently from his co-employees where the risk posed by the defective product does not differ
from the kind of risk prevailing in the employment community. 59
The advantages of adopting this approach are many. It would
free vast sums of money currently spent to finance employee dam-

age awards and to pay personal injury lawyers. 6 ° The resulting
savings could be used to more fully compensate injured employees
who are covered only by workers' compensation.'61

note 17, at §§ 9.01-10.8(5). A similar test is used to determine the circumstances in
which an employee can sue his co-employee at common law. The test used in such
cases is slightly narrower than the course of employment test used to determine
whether an employee can be awarded workers' compensation benefits. See LARSON
supra note 1,at § 71.20. If an employee is not within the scope of his employment
when he injures another employee, the immunity from common-law suits under the
California Labor Code will not attach. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3601 (West Supp. 1977).
For a discussion of co-employee immunity, see Comment, The Third Party Action-Expanding the Circle of Immunity: Coemployees, 48 Miss. L.J. 87 (1977).
A test similar to the course of employment standard can also be found in
respondeat superior cases. Under respondeat superior, a victim can sue the master
for the tort of the servant providing that the employee was within the scope of his
employment at the time of the tortious transaction. See, e.g., Meyer v. Blackman,
59 Cal. 2d 668, 381 P.2d 916, 31 Cal. Rptr. 36 (1%3); Rodgers v. Kemper Constr.
Co., 50 Cal. App. 3d 608, 124 Cal. Rptr. 143 (4th Dist. 1975).
The multitude of causation tests used by the courts in cases of enterprise
liability is evident in Steffen, Enterprise Liability: Some Exploratory Comments, 17
HASTINGS L. J. 165 (1965).

158. See text accompanying note 69 supra.
159. See text accompanying 70 supra.
160. See O'Connell, supra note 12, at 435-40. It has been demonstrated that
tort damage awards are far more lucrative than workers' compensation benefits.
See notes 5, 34 supra. It follows that if a number of tort damage awards for injured
employees are barred, the money previously used to finance such awards can be put
to other uses. One such use would be the upgrading of workers' compensation
benefits for all employees. See note 128 supra.
161.
SATION

The REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMM'N ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPEN-

LAWS (1972) concludes that workmen's compensation benefits are drastically inadequate. The same conclusion is reached in Burton & Berkowitz, Objectives
Other Than Income Maintenance for Workmen's Compensation, 38 J.RISK & INS.
343 (1971), and in Berkowitz & Burton, The Income Maintenance Objective in
Workmen's Compensation, 24 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 14 (1970). Indeed, if the
money saved by the curtailment of product liability suits by employees is not used
to more fully compensate injured employees who are covered only by workers'
compensation, the argument for the curtailment of such suits may lose merit. See
notes 65-66 & accompanying text supra. The equity considerations of not treating
consumers and employees too differently would militate against a curtailment of the
employee's rights against third parties if there was not a corresponding increase in
the value of workers' compensation benefits. See notes 65-66 & accompanying
text supra.
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Additionally, this approach would permit employees to assess

more accurately the value of the risks in a particular type of
employment. The employee's determination of whether he wants to
confront a risk depends in large part on the extent of compensation

he will receive if the risk materializes into an injury. Under the
present state of the law, differing measures of compensation are

given for injuries resulting from the same risk. 162 With regard to
machinery or other products, there is no reason, however, to suppose
that the probability of product defectiveness is greater than the
probability that injury will be caused by any of the sources of injury
covered exclusively by workers' compensation. 163 In fact, the con-

verse is true: It is more likely that an injury sustained in the
operation of a machine will be due to co-employee, employee, or
employer negligence, or to an unavoidable consequence of industrial production. This follows because the greater deterrent of tort
damages is applied to product defectiveness whereas only the limited financial impact of workers' compensation benefits deter
sources of injury such as co-employee or employer negligence.

Thus, under the present system, the value of exposure to risk cannot
be accurately perceived by the employee because he is faced with a

lottery: Depending on the source of the injury, the employee may or
may not be able to obtain full tort compensation."

Finally, the proposed test would preserve the protection of
strict products liability when the employee needs it most: when he is
injured by a consumer product, and when the risk is not typical of
65
the employment situation. 1
162. Suppose that working with a piece of machinery presents a risk of burns to
the arms. Under the present law, if the source of injury from the risk is coemployee negligence or employer negligence, the employee is limited to workers'
compensation benefits. If the source is a product defect, the employee can obtain
the full compensation of tort damages.
163. All things being equal, under the present state of the law, the probability
that products used on the job are defective should be less than the probability that a
co-employee or an employer will be negligent and cause injury. This follows since
the deterrent of tort damages is applied to product manufacturing, whereas the only
deterrent to co-employee or employer negligence is the more meager deterrent of
workers' compensation benefits. The reason the statement above is qualified by the
phrase "all things being equal" is that the probability of injury from product
defectiveness depends in large part on product characteristics. Some products
may be incapable of being made safe--explosives for example. Such products may
thus present high probabilities of causing injury. The fact remains, however, that
even if the product is highly dangerous and presents a high probability of injury, the
actual source of injury is not more likely to be product defectiveness than careless
handling or negligent use.
164. See notes 148-52 & accompanying text supra.
165. It may be thought that the proposed test does not eliminate the dissonance
between a worker who can recover tort damages for injuries sustained as the result
of a defective consumer good and a worker whose remedies remain confined to the
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CONCLUSION

Workers' compensation was established at the turn of the
century when tort law was still much steeped in the ideology of fault
and wrongdoing as necessary prerequisites to compensation. 66
' This
ideology of fault was seen as highly inappropriate for compensation
of work-related injuries, and workers' compensation emerged as a
no-fault system of enterprise liability. Tort law, however, did not
remain entrapped in the language of fault. In the 1960's, strict
liability emerged as the law governing product injuries.' 67 The
rationalia and purposes of strict products liability have come to
resemble those of workers' compensation. Yet, paradoxically, the
two systems of compensation continue to afford greatly differing
measures of compensation. Within the realm of product-caused
injuries incurred on the job, this paradox seems particularly apparent. It therefore becomes difficult to determine whether an employee injured by a product on the job should be compensated under
workers' compensation or strict products liability. The proper resolution of the paradox in terms of the employee's rights against third
party manufacturers would be to administer compensation for those
product injuries typical of the employment under workers' compensation and those not typical of the employment under the common
law of strict products liability.
PIERRE JOHN SCHLAG
receipt of workers' compensation benefits. In a sense, this is true: There will be
employees who suffer injuries caused by co-employee negligence or employer
negligence and who are limited to meager workers' compensation benefits. Other
workers who are injured by defective consumer goods may be able to recover tort
damages from third party manufacturers. This situation, however, underscores the
tension between the level of protection given to consumers as opposed to the level
of protection afforded by workers' compensation. This tension cannot be resolved
unless workers' compensation is scrapped or strict products liability gives way to a
no-fault system for product injuries. Meanwhile minor solace can be taken in the
recognition that the proposed test treats employees injured by defective products
more like consumers, when they occupy the position of consumers, and more like
employees, when they occupy the role of employees.

166. See notes 17-30 & accompanying text supra.
167. See notes 36-57 & accompanying text supra.

